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Forced migration has been in the news over the last decade due to the remarkable rise in
both refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). In order to analyze the evolution of
forced migration, it is very important to determine which factors are the cause of internal or
external forced migration, why forced migrants leave, and from which origin countries and
to which destination countries they go. Millions of refugees and IDPs move away from their
home locations every year in order to survive, and this number has increased exponentially
over the last decades. Therefore, we crucially need to know the factors behind these move-
ments to fight forced migration more effectively in the future.
This thesis studies the evolution of forced migration from three perspectives, which cor-
respond to the three main chapters: (i) an analysis of dyadic refugee flows and their deter-
minants, (ii) a spatial model of internal displacement in origin countries and (ii) the gender
balance of refugee flows in destination countries.
The first chapter investigates the determinants of global forced migration using a grav-
ity model, a workbench used to model international trade and migration. Most studies about
forced migration are focused on a specific region, most often Western European Countries, and
only based on destination flows. Therefore, it is difficult to get a clear explanation regarding
refugee flows if only certain destination countries are considered, without taking into account
from which origin countries forced migrants emigrate. In order to understand forced migra-
tion, it is essential to relate origin and destination countries, along with the characteristics of
the origin country. In other words, the goal of this chapter is to determine the causes that lead
to refugees leaving origin countries, and the factors which attract those refugees to specific
destination countries. The motivation of this analysis also consists on the UNHCR data show-
ing that the pattern of forced migration flows has changed. Over the last three decades, the
evolution of refugee flows has grown exponentially, thus becoming a very relevant issue in our
society. Thus, our goal is to model global patterns of refugee migration. Previous literature on
forced migration has proven that factors like armed conflicts and the standards of democracy
or civil liberties play a central role in the determination of forced migration, along with dyadic
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variables like distance between origin and destination countries, and sharing a common border
or language.
The evidence reported below indicates that conflict in the source country, civil liberties in
the origin and destination countries, population at destination countries, as well as proximity
of source and destination country, are the most significant driving factors of forced migration.
These results have one important policy implication: the only channel through which politi-
cians can influence refugee counts is by external policy directed towards reducing conflict and
improving the standards of civil liberties in the source countries.
The second chapter develops a spatial model of internal and external forced migration,
reminiscent of Hotelling’s spatial model in economics and Schelling’s model of segregation.
We study how refugees and IDPs are generated, that is, why some become refugees while
other displaced persons remain in their countries of origin as IDPs. Forced displacement may
have its origin in armed conflict, lack of civil liberties or political rights and natural disasters.
However, internal and external displacement share a common cause: armed conflict. When
we focus on displaced people who escape from armed conflict, the distinguishing feature
between refugees and IDPs is whether they cross an international border. The evolution of both
groups has been completely different over the last few decades: while the aggregate number
of refugees increased steadily up to the beginning of the nineties, the aggregate number of
IDPs has remarkably grown since 2000, surpassing the number of refugees, and currently
standing at 41 million. As refugees and IDPs are driven by a common cause, it seems logical
to study both groups of people simultaneously. However, the literature on forced displacement
is mainly divided into refugee studies on the one hand,and internal displacement studies on
the other. While refugees and IDPs share a common cause, their evolution over the last few
decades is very different. Thus, the goal of this chapter is to investigate the role of spatial
factors in determining the split into the two groups.
Furthermore, the model designed below builds a bridge between internal and external
forced migration. As far as we know, simultaneous modeling of internal and external forced
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migration has not been attempted before.
The spatial model we develop represents armed conflict as a shock that takes place at
a particular location and generates a migration flow. The model predicts how the number
of refugees and IDPs, as a fraction of a country’s population, varies with the intensity of
armed conflict and geographical covariates such as country size, orography and distance to
other countries. In our model, armed conflict has a causal effect on displacement, and the
geographical variables exert a modification effect on displacement.
The final chapter studies the difference in the number of male and female refugees, i.e.
the gender bias in destination flows. This chapter contributes a gender perspective to the
forced migration literature. Most studies related to refugee destination flows do not distinguish
between male and female refugees. UNHCR data shows that, for many destination countries,
the number of male refugees is far greater than the number of female refugees. Therefore, it
is very important to understand why male refugees tend to go in larger numbers than female
refugees to certain destination countries. The situation of female refugees has been studied
from many perspectives, but there are not studies relating to the gender profile of refugee
destination flows, neither on a country-level, nor on a global level. This chapter is an attempt
to fill this gap in the literature.
We study the extent to which refugee arrivals in destination countries exhibit a gender bias,
and its determinants. In order to analyze the gender bias, we take into account factors such
as civil liberties and destination country per capita GDP, country of origin-related variables
weighted by distance, along with measures of women’s rights.
Women’s economic and social rights are worse than men’s in most countries. This suggests
that women will tend to find it more difficult to flee to certain countries with lower standards of
women’s rights. However, the evidence indicates that female refugees flee to countries where










This chapter makes use of a gravity model to investigate the determinants of global forced
migration. We find that omitting zero counts results in parameter estimates that underestimate
the effect of covariates on refugee counts. We compare the pooled regression, which does not
account for unobserved heterogeneity, and the fixed-effects method, which does not identify
the effect of time-invariant covariates, and cannot shed much light when covariates vary little.
We propose the Pre-sample Mean Generalized Method of Moments (PSM-GMM) estimator,
which accommodates the zeros, accounts for unobserved heterogeneity, but does not have the
drawbacks of the fixed-effects methods when covariates exhibit little variation. In addition,
using recently developed methods to estimate standard errors that are robust to dyadic corre-
lation, we find evidence suggesting that previous findings based on underestimated standard
errors mostly remain true after properly adjusting standard errors.In particular, conflict and
civil liberties at the source country and proximity are found to be significant determinants of
forced migration. However, some covariates previously found to be significant, such as shar-
ing a common language or having a colonial relationship, lose significance. In addition, we
find a significant positive influence of the level of civil liberties in the destination country on
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the number of refugees it receives, a mechanism not explored before.
1.1 Introduction
Over the years, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has compiled
a database on the number of refugee and refugee-like people, classified according to their
country of origin and asylum/residence.1
This chapter explores these data by means of a gravity model of global forced migration.
Contrary to the norm in forced migration studies where the analysis is typically restricted to a
region, most often Western European Countries, this chapter studies global forced migration
counts.
This analysis is motivated because the UNHCR data shows that the pattern of forced mi-
gration flows has changed. During the first decades after its inception in 1950, the number of
origin and destination countries was small. However, nowadays almost all countries are the
origin of refugees and most of them are also the destination of some refugees. Thus, our goal
is to model global patterns of refugee migration.
The gravity model, a workbench used to model international trade and migration, stands
as a natural way to describe this type of data. The specification of the covariates used in the
gravity model borrows from previous research on forced migration.
Previous evidence has it that the existence of armed conflict and the standards of democ-
racy or civil liberties play a central role in the determination of forced migration. In addition,
researchers have found that dyadic magnitudes such as distance between countries and sharing
a common border or language are fundamental determinants of forced migration.
A second distinguishing feature of this chapter is the type of data analyzed. While most of
the empirical analysis in the literature focuses on asylum application data, our analysis uses
1The term asylum/residence is used by the UNHCR to account for those refugees to whom the asylum statute
has been granted and also those to whom the asylum statute has been denied or simply did not apply for it. In the
sequel, we will use the term “destination countries” to refer to asylum/residence countries.
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UNHCR refugee counts, which include asylum applicants and also those people who are in a
refugee-like situation but, for whatever the reason, did not apply for asylum.
These data are, therefore, less exposed to the problem often claimed for application data,
i.e., the supposition that many asylum seekers are in fact economic migrants. This benefit
comes at the cost of having less accurate data, as the UNHCR compiles them using not only
administrative records from national governments, but also from Nongovernmental Organiza-
tions (NGOs) and UNHCR field officers estimates.
A third contribution of this chapter is methodological. Analysis of dyadic data, such as
the refugee counts analyzed in this chapter, involves some issues on which not all researchers
agree. We contribute to two of these debates on the analysis of dyadic data.
First, we look at the consequences of treating as missing or zeros all unobserved dyads.
Second, we study the consequences of pooling together all observations versus allowing for
dyad-specific unobserved effects, and propose a third route to account for unobserved hetero-
geneity using the Pre-sample Mean Generalized Method of Moments (PSM-GMM) estimation
method.
A fourth contribution of this chapter is to assess whether previous empirical evidence on
forced migration remains valid in light of the recently developed methods to make standard
errors robust to inter-dyad correlation. For instance, in a directed dyadic relation, two obser-
vations might be correlated if they share common origin or destination.
Typically used standard errors that are clustered at the dyad are robust to intra-dyad cor-
relation, but ignore inter-dyad correlation and overestimate the precision of the estimates.
Montecarlo-based evidence, e.g. Cameron and Miller (2014), suggests that properly adjusted
standard errors that are robust to inter-dyadic correlation could be several times larger than
those that account for intra-dyadic correlation.
The evidence reported below indicates that conflict at the source country, civil liberties at
the origin and destination countries, population at destination countries and proximity are the
most significant driving factors of forced migration.
23
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These results have one important policy implication: the only channel through which
politicians can influence refugee counts is by external policy directed towards reducing con-
flict and improving the standards of civil liberties in the source countries. Although most of
the driving forces were already known in the literature, we find evidence that as civil liberties
improve at the destination countries, more refugees will choose that destination.
Section 2 provides a few references to the literature on forced migration. Section 3 de-
scribes the United Nations data on refugees. Section 4 describes the gravity model and Sec-
tion 5 the methods. The main results are reported in Section 6, which is followed by some
robustness checks in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 highlights the main conclusions and policy
implications of this research.
1.2 Literature review
Theoretical studies on forced migration range from cost-sharing models, where the aim is to
implement a way to share the burden among hosting countries, to behavioral models where
refugees are subject to strict restrictions, but there is still some room for choice, e.g. Czaika
(2009b). The burden share models, e.g., Czaika (2009a), and the empirical evidence, e.g.,
Roper and Barria (2010), suggest that states regard refugee protection by the UNHCR as
an impure public good, as defined by Sandler and Hartley (2001). Namely, such protection
provides both country-specific and purely public benefits.
Several previous empirical studies on forced migration have focused on asylum seeker ap-
plications in Western Europe. These include the analysis of asylum recognition rates, e.g.,
Holzer et al. (2000) and Neumayer (2005b), refugee origin, e.g., Neumayer (2005a) and des-
tination choice, e.g., Havinga and Böcker (1999) and Neumayer (2004).
There are also empirical studies for African countries, e.g., Iqbal (2007), a continent that
has witnessed large flows of interstate forced migration. Moore and Shellman (2007b) study
destination patterns using global data as done here.
24
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Scholars have not only studied the determinants of forced migration but also analyzed its
effects. Inflows of forced migrants have been found to increase the likelihood of civil war
in the asylum country, e.g., Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006). Refugee flows between states
significantly increase the likelihood of militarized interstate conflict (e.g., Salehyan (2008)).
Origin countries have been found to be the source country of transnational terrorism (e.g.,
Milton et al. (2013)).
On the contrary, there is evidence suggesting that the higher the inflow of refugees a coun-
try receives, the more likely it is to contribute to peacekeeping missions in the refugee source
country (e.g., Uzonyi (2015)), and to contribute more Official Development Assistance to the
refugee source country (e.g., Czaika (2009b)).
All the available empirical evidence indicates that armed conflict in the source country is
the most important determinant of forced migration. Yet, perhaps the single clearest piece
of evidence is Ball et al. (2002), who provide two-day frequency estimates of the number of
killings that occurred in Kosovo from late March to mid-June 1999 and the number of refugees
who migrated. Their plots show how these two magnitudes exhibit astonishing parallel trends.
A similarly important determinant of forced migration is the absence of civil liberties or
political rights in the country of origin, (e.g., Neumayer (2004), Neumayer (2005b) and Moore
and Shellman (2007b)). Previous research has found geographic proximity as well as sharing a
common language and being a former colonizer to be determinants of forced migration, (e.g.,
Barthel and Neumayer (2015)).
1.3 Persons of concern data
According to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, UNHCR (2011), a refugee
is someone who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself
25
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of the protection of that country."
The 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention governing the specific aspects of
refugee problems in Africa, UNHCR (2006), accepted the definition of the 1951 Refugee
Convention with the 1967 Protocol and extended it to include people who left their countries of
origin not only because of persecution, but also due to acts of external aggression, occupation,
domination by foreign powers or serious disturbances of public order.
The Convention does not apply to those who are believed to have committed war crimes,
crimes against humanity, serious non-political crimes or those who benefit from protection
from or assistance of a United Nations agency other than UNHCR, notably the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East, UNRWA. In addition
to refugees, the UNHCR currently assists millions of other persons who do not fulfill the
definition given above but are in a refugee-like situation.
In summary, a person can ask for refugee status for only two reasons: conflict or perse-
cution in the country of origin. Therefore, the existence of conflict and the absence of civil
liberties or political rights are the fundamental determinants of why a person would flee his or
her country of origin to become a refugee.
The UNHCR provides two sources of data: the persons of concern data and the asylum
seekers (applications) dataset. Both data sets are worth exploring. The asylum application
data has been extensively analyzed elsewhere.2
We focus our analysis on the persons of concern data base. While the asylum application
data is compiled by governmental agencies, the persons of concern database draws from in-
formation from those same governmental agencies and also from UNHCR field officers and
NGOs.
In addition to having received less attention in the past, there are other reasons why we
focus on the persons of concern database. First, the asylum application data might be affected
by a sample selection problem. As argued by Jones (2009), refugee status determination varies
2See Neumayer (2004, 2005a, 2005b) and Barthel and Neumayer (2015).
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considerably both between countries and also within country.
Knowing this, forced migrants might decide to self select into the application process,
thus introducing a sample selection problem. In addition, it is often argued that some of the
applicants might be economic migrants.
Second, the persons of concern database, however, includes data from asylum applications
as well as from UNHCR field officers and NGOs’ estimates on those cases where public
authorities cannot provide the numbers.
The UNHCR’s population of concern database provides counts of refugees; that is, those
individuals recognized under the 1951 Convention, its 1967 Protocol, the 1969 OAU Conven-
tion as well as people in a refugee-like situation. It also includes Palestinian refugees living
outside the UNRWA areas of operation. The UNHCR’s database includes dyadic refugee
counts for pairs of country of origin, asylum/residence country and year.3
The persons of concern database also includes other categories: Internally Displaced Per-
sons (IDPs), asylum seekers (pending applications), stateless persons, returnees, and other
persons of concern and resettlements. In the sequel, we will focus on UNHCR’s data on
refugees.
In some cases, UNHCR’s data run from as early as 1951 to 2014, with the 2014 data being
incomplete. We first look at the time trends of the aggregate data to give a broad picture of
the data set. We add up counts of refugees across country of origin and residence to obtain a
single annual time series.
As shown in Figure 1.1, the total number of refugees remained more or less stable during
the 50s, 60s and early 70s when it started to rise steadily to 17.8 million in 1991. Thereafter,
refugee counts started to fall.
3Crisp (1999) explain these data.
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Figure 1.1: Trends in the aggregate number of refugees
Summary statistics reported in Table 1.1 indicate that there are 84,393 counts of refugees
ranging from 1 to 3.272 million persons. A distinct mark of these data is that, refugee counts
take a minimum value of one person, so there are no zeros in the data.
Table 1.1: Summary statistics
Variable # obs. mean stand. dev. min max
Refugees 84,393 5,992 65,752 1 3,272,290
The absence of zeros may be due to the way the UNHCR collects the data. Governmental
agencies, UNHCR field officers and NGOs report counts of persons to the UNHCR statistical
office. Of course, these are positive counts.
Therefore, it is our understanding that those censored dyad counts are in fact zeros. The
UNHCR started recording refugee counts in its first mandate in December 1950. The records
for the early years contain only a few data points corresponding to the number of refugees in
each country of asylum/residence while the origin country is unknown.
The first registered entry with a specific origin country is in 1960. Figure 1.2 plots the
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number of (known) countries of origin and asylum/residence per year. The number of coun-
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Figure 1.2: Number of countries of origin and residence by year
This graph shows how forced migration has experienced a tremendous change. What used
to be a flow of people from conflicted, mostly developing countries now also originates from
developed countries that are not experiencing armed conflict.
Figure 1.3 plots the number of refugees whose origin is the United States, United Kingdom
and Sweden to all destination countries.4 This figure shows that well-developed democratic
countries are also the source of refugees.
Figure 1.4 shows the number of positive dyad counts per year. The annual number of dyad
observations up until 1978 was always below 100, reached 1,000 by 1993 and almost 5,000 in
2013. If we simply multiply the number of countries of origin by the number of destination
4USA data exclude those refugees who flee to Canada, which are abnormally high due to the Safe Third
Country Agreement between Canada and the United States. Under the Agreement, refugee claimants in each
country are required to request refugee protection in the first safe country they arrive in, despite whether their
final destination is another country.
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countries, we obtain the potential number of dyad observations, which is also plotted in Figure
1.4.5
In 2013, we observe approximately 5,000 out of the 35,000 potential dyad observations,
hence about 6 out of every 7 potential dyadic observations have been missed. Some of these
“missing” observations could actually be missing observations, but as argued above, the bulk
of them correspond to dyads where there are no flows of forced migrants. Therefore, we will
treat them as zeros. In addition to refugee data, this chapter also uses data on other covariates
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Figure 1.3: Number of refugees to all destinations from selected countries
5Notice that the theoretically feasible number of dyads is the square of the number of sovereign states, which
is a larger number than what we call potential number of dyad observations.
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Figure 1.4: Number of dyad observations by year
1.4 The gravity model
The gravity model was originally introduced by Tinbergen (1962) to study international trade
flows. Gravity models are used to model other forms of international factor movements: For-
eign Direct Investment (FDI) (e.g., Stone and Bang (1999)), trade and FDI (e.g., Bergstrand
and Egger (2007) ) and migration (e.g., Vanderkamp (1977). Leamer and Levinsohn (1995)
claim that gravity models have produced some of the clearest and most robust empirical find-
ings in economics.
Anderson (2011) argues that the gravity model has been “one of the most successful em-
pirical models in economics, ordering remarkably well the enormous observed variation in
economic interaction across space in both trade and factor movements”. However, gravity
models did not have a significant impact on the subject of international economics until they
were justified on theoretical grounds (e.g., Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)).
When applied to international trade in goods, the economic analogy to Newton’s Law of
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Gravitation is described as follows. Omitting reference to time, we have that the flow of goods
between a country of origin i and a destination country j, Mi j, is proportional to the product
of the masses of the origin and destination countries, Yi and Yj, and inversely proportional to
the squared distance between them, Di j, i.e. Mi j = YiYj/D
2
i j, where the masses are proxied by
the GDP of the two countries.
The gravity model has also been applied to describe forced migration at least once (see
Iqbal (2007)). Note that the gravity models of forced and voluntary migration use the counts
of refugees and migrants as dependent variables, respectively. Thus, the dependent variable is
a stock, while the gravity models of trade and foreign investment use flows. We will stick to
the norm in the literature and use the stock variable as the outcome of interest. When trying
to explain forced migration, the mass variable of the gravity model is population.
The population of the country of origin measures the size of the potential number of people
“at risk” while the population of the destination country measures its capacity to host refugees.
The square distance is a proxy of the cost that refugees face when moving from the origin to
the asylum country.
Two key factors generating refugee populations are the presence of armed conflict, and the
level of civil liberties of both the origin and asylum countries. On the one hand, countries with
low standards of civil liberties will tend to “produce” more refugees, while countries with high
levels of civil liberties ought to be more willing to host forced migrants.
On the other hand, people will escape from countries in conflict and will be reluctant
to enter countries in conflict. In addition, other potential determinants of forced migration
include dyadic variables such as whether the origin and asylum countries share a common
language or a border.
Including civil liberties, conflict and other potential determinants of forced migration, we
can write an extended gravity equation where the stock of refugees of origin country i hosted
by country j, Ri j, is
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where Xki, k = 1, ...,K, are origin-specific variables, Xl j, l = 1, ...,L, are destination-specific
variables, Zsi j, s = 1, ...,S, are variables that vary with both origin and destination, and ϑi
and δ j are time-invariant origin- and destination-specific unobserved factors. Note that all
variables are now weighted by a corresponding parameter and the RHS includes a gravitational
constant, κ.
1.5 Estimation methods
Estimation of gravity equations have led authors to two debates. The first debate deals with
the specification of the gravity equation in logarithmic or exponential form. Most scholars
use a convenient log-linearized transformation of Equation 1.1, which is assumed to hold on
average, leading to the conditional mean regression equation:
E
(















γs lnZsi jt + lnϑi + lnδ j (1.2)
which is then estimated by ordinary least squares. This procedure has been criticized by Flow-
erdew and Aitkin (1982) and Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) on several grounds, particu-
larly, the existence of zero values of the dependent variable, which invalidates the logarithmic
transformation or forces the researcher to drop observation with zeros in the outcome of inter-
est.
On occasions, researchers take logs after adding a small quantity (typically 1) to the depen-
dent variable, so that the dependent variable takes a strictly positive value and the logarithmic
transformation is feasible. Note, however, that such a transformation is incompatible with the
gravity model, as one would have to add that small quantity to both the left-hand side (LHS)
and right-hand side (RHS) of the gravity equation and then the log-linearization is no longer
feasible. Instead, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) suggest modeling the conditional mean of
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the dependent variable itself as an exponential function of the form
E
(

















γs lnZsi jt + lnϑi + lnδ j
)
(1.3)
which can be estimated using Poisson-GMM-like estimators. Note that both the logarithmic
and exponential regressions have all regressors measured in logs and therefore the parameters
we aim to estimate are the same whether estimated in log-linearized or exponential mean
forms. Therefore, the parameters of logarithmic and exponential specifications are directly
comparable and can be interpreted as elasticities.
A second debate in the literature involves the issue of whether to account for unobserved
heterogeneity in dyadic data modeling. Green et al. (2001) warned against “dirty pooling” and
recommended using dyad-specific fixed effects, while Beck and Katz (2001) suggested that
using dyad fixed effects is sometimes like “throwing out the baby with the bath water”.
Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity is necessary when it is correlated with the co-
variates; however, conventional fixed effects methods cannot be used to identify the effect
of time-invariant covariates, which are often of research interest. In our empirical analysis,
we report pooled and fixed effects evidence. In addition, we use the PSM-GMM estimator
introduced by Blundell et al. (2002).
This estimation procedure accounts for unobserved heterogeneity by making use of pre-
sample information on the dependent variable. The pre-sample average over destinations
(origins) is proportional to the unobserved time-invariant origin-(destination-) specific het-
erogeneity and therefore can be used as aproxy.6
Using the observed refugee counts for the 1951-1989 pre-sample period, we calculate the
sample averages of those counts for each country of origin and country of asylum/residence
and use these averages as proxies for the unobserved origin-specific and destination-specific
6In order to see this, average equation 1.1 over destinations (respectively, origins) during the pre-sample
period.
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unobserved effects. By doing so, we avoid “dirty pooling” and account for unobserved het-
erogeneity but do not “throw[..] out the baby with the bath water”.
It is worth noting that if gravity model 1.1 holds, there is no need to include interaction
terms on the RHS of the logarithmic or exponential regressions. It is also worth noting that, in
the empirical part of the chapter, several covariates are categorical, for instance, civil liberties
is measured in seven ordered categories. Thus, we approximate the regression function as a
linear function of the dummy indicators representing categories.
It was not until very recently that researchers developed methods to adjust standard errors
for arbitrary correlation among dyads. Standard errors clustered at the dyad level, often used
in dyadic regressions, are robust to correlation among observations within a dyad. The dyadic
correlation that the new developments account for is between dyads.
To make the point, consider two observations of a dyadic relation, say pairs (i, j) and
(k, l). It could be the case that an observation from dyad (i, j) is correlated with another
observation from dyad (k, l) if i= k or i= l or j = k or j = l. In words, consider an observation
corresponding to the count of refugees from Syria to Germany.
The disturbance corresponding to that observation could be correlated with any other dis-
turbance whose origin or destination is either Syria or Germany. The idea was first developed
within network analysis, Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), and extended by Cameron and Miller
(2014) and Aronow et al. (2015).
Alternatively, standard errors can be computed using a randomization procedure, as in
Erikson et al. (2014), but this might entail a considerably large numerical exercise. In a Monte
Carlo experiment, Cameron and Miller (2014) find that dyadic correlation robust standard
errors are several times larger than the typically used heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
(which are those obtained by allowing for clustering at the dyad level).
As a consequence of the timing of these developments, previous empirical evidence does
not employ these recently developed methods, so previously made inferences could be incor-
rect. In our empirical application, we compute standard errors that account for the so called
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two-way dyadic correlation, as suggested by Cameron et al. (2011). Under this type of dyadic
correlation, disturbances are correlated if they share a common origin or a common destination
country.
Based on the previous example, the disturbance corresponding to the Syria-Germany dyad
would be allowed to be correlated with any other disturbance from an observation whose origin
is Syria or whose destination is Germany. We believe that the two-way dyadic correlation
structure is appropriate for refugee count data.
However, should this assumption be incorrect so that the disturbance from the Syria-
Germany dyad is also correlated with other disturbances from dyads where Syria is the desti-
nation or Germany is the origin, the properly adjusted standard errors would be about ten per
cent larger as shown by Cameron and Miller (2014).
A final comment in this methods section deals with the zero-inflated models often used
to analyze count data, e.g. Moore and Shellman (2007b). We believe that zero-inflated count
models are not appropriate to model refugee counts. These models are often used to analyze
data arising from a mixture of two different processes or distributions.
For instance, consider the number of insurance claims from a random sample of individu-
als. In this case, many of the zeros will correspond to individuals not exposed to the risk, while
some of the zeros will correspond to individuals exposed to the risk but who did not claimed
any insurance compensation. This type of data is naturally described by a zero-inflated count
model. Refugee data, we believe, accrue from only one process.
The number of refugees fleeing a country could be positive or zero, but all countries could
potentially have positive numbers and in fact most of them do. Nevertheless, with dyadic data,
it turns out that many dyads have zero counts because of great distances between countries or
because the number of destination countries is larger than the number of origin countries. The
Poisson-type exponential regression model used in this chapter can account for a large number
of zeros.
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1.6 Empirics
As illustrated in Section 1.3, although refugee counts data run from 1951, it would not be
until the 90s when most countries would be both origin and destination; hence, we restrict our
analysis to the 1990-2013 period, using 1951-1989 as the pre-sample period referred to above.
We created a dyadic data set as follows. First, we listed all 210 countries that were the
origin or destination of at least one refugee in the UNHCR data, excluding some overseas ter-
ritories and micro-states. Second, we constructed all feasible dyads among the 210 countries.
Third, we extended those dyads from 1951 to 2013, excluding the dyads involving newly
formed countries for the time periods prior to their inception. Fourth, we merged refugee
data and the other covariates into this data set resulting in 76,360 positive refugee counts and
970,055 zero refugee counts. As there are missing covariate values, we ended up running
regressions with up to 697,845 observations for 31,507 different dyads from 178 origin and
destination countries.
All regressions include the same set of regressors: (Log) Population in the origin and desti-
nation countries, dummy variables indicating whether there is an armed conflict in the country
of origin or destination, and two sets of dummies that correspond to the (ordered) categories
of civil liberties in the origin and asylum/residence countries, from Category 1 (omitted) rep-
resenting the highest level of civil liberties to Category 7 with the lowest level of civil liberties.
In addition, we also include (Log) GDP per capita of the origin and destination countries to al-
low for the possibility that besides conflict and persecution, refugee counts include economic
migrants who flee the origin country and might choose to go to richer destination countries.
Table 1.2 reports estimates of the (log-linearized) gravity equation using a total of (up to)
64,516 directed dyadic positive counts. Each regression is reported in a double column for
monadic variables and a single column for dyadic ones. Reported standard errors are adjusted
for two-way clustering.
The pooled logarithmic specification suggests that population is a significant determinant
of forced migration and that more populated countries tend to be source and destination of
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larger numbers of refugees. Notice that the parameter estimate of population at the destination
country is more than three times the size of the parameter estimate of population at the origin
country.
Conflict at the origin country has a positive and significant effect on the number of refugees
who flee from that country, but conflict at the destination country is not a significant determi-
nant of which destination they choose. According to this finding, refugees escape from conflict
and flee to countries where there might or might not be conflict.
The level of civil liberties, both at the origin and the asylum country, is a significant de-
terminant of refugee flows, albeit with different signs. Civil liberties dummies numbered 2
to 7 have positive coefficients for the country of origin and negative ones for the destination
country indicating that, with respect to origin and destination countries with the highest stan-
dards of civil liberties, lower standards of civil liberties at the origin (respectively, destination)
country tend to increase (decrease) the number of refugees who flee from that source (enter
that destination). Looking at the economic motivation, the pooled regression estimates suggest
that poorer countries, with lower GDP per capita, tend to be the origin of significantly more
refugees, but richer countries do not host significantly more refugees.
All dyadic regressors are statistically significant. Distance between source and destina-
tion countries acts as a “transportation cost” reducing the counts of refugees between distant
countries. Sharing a border is strongly significant, indicating that destination countries often
receive forced migrants from neighbor countries. Sharing a common language also affects the
number of refugees flows positively and significantly.
The “Colonizer” variable indicating whether the destination country was a former colo-
nizer of the origin country has a positive and significant effect on refugee counts. The pooled
regression estimates occur in “dirty pooling” as they do not account for unobserved hetero-
geneity.
Ignoring unobserved heterogeneity generates two problems. First, parameter estimates are
less efficient than those we would obtain by accounting for such heterogeneity in a random
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effects regression. Although this is an important issue, it does not seem to be relevant in our
analysis as standard errors are already very small.
A second more important problem is that failing to account for unobserved heterogeneity
might result in inconsistent parameter estimates if those unobserved factors not only affect the
outcome variable (refugee counts), but also affect the covariates included in our regressions.
To cope with this problem, Table 1.2 also reports dyad-specific fixed effects. The results are
now very different from those obtained in the pooled regression.
Table 1.2: Logarithmic specification
Pooled Fixed effects
Origin Destination Origin Destination
Log - Population 0.1621*** 0.4911*** 0.9390* -0.9646
(0.0541) (0.0719) (0.5260) (0.6844)
Conflict 0.6271*** 0.0773 0.0652 0.1821
(0.1460) (0.3561) (0.0490) (0.2787)
Civil Liberties_2 1.3163*** -1.5101*** 0.8151*** -0.2992**
(0.2894) (0.2364) (0.2679) (0.1363)
Civil Liberties_3 1.4540*** -1.9193*** 1.2496*** -0.2355
(0.3407) (0.2999) (0.3535) (0.1778)
Civil Liberties_4 1.6242*** -1.8961*** 1.3541*** 0.0128
(0.3581) (0.3000) (0.3648) (0.2071)
Civil Liberties_5 1.8572*** -1.8873*** 1.5036*** -0.0770
(0.3576) (0.3362) (0.3781) (0.2447)
Civil Liberties_6 2.2289*** -1.6760*** 1.5959*** -0.0991
(0.3853) (0.3571) (0.3794) (0.2690)
Civil Liberties_7 2.4175*** -1.3430*** 1.7728*** 0.1627
(0.4404) (0.4674) (0.4277) (0.3905)
Log - GDP pc -0.2048** 0.1293 -0.9226*** -0.2351
(0.0809) (0.1028) (0.2513) (0.4115)











Countries 178 163 178 163
Dyads 5,868 5,868
R-squared 0.2818
All regressions include year dummies. Two-way clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
One, two and three starts stand for 10, 5 and 1 per cent significance levels.
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The population estimated coefficients are much larger than those of the pooled regressions
for the origin country. For the destination country, population is a negative but insignificant
influence.
Parameter estimates associated with conflict at the origin country are now much smaller
and insignificant. Notice that this result goes against the basic intuition that conflict at the
origin country is a determinant of refugee flows.
Dummies for civil liberties at the origin country have positive and significant but smaller
parameter estimates. Civil liberties at the destination country turn out to be insignificant, with
the exception of the dummy for the second level of civil liberties.
Therefore, civil liberties in countries having the second highest civil liberties standards
would receive fewer refugees than those in the reference group, while countries with low
standards of civil liberties would not host necessarily more refugees.
GDP per capita at the origin country has a positive and significant effect, while it is in-
significant at the destination country, as it was in the pooled regression. Finally, the fixed
effects estimation method fails to identify the effect of time-invariant dyadic variables.
Why are the pooled and fixed effects results different? Pooling all observations together
and ignoring unobserved heterogeneity could be biasing the results in the “dirty pooling”
regression if unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with the regressors.
On the other hand, the dyad-specific fixed effects regression cannot identify the effect of
the time-invariant covariates.
The dyad-specific fixed effects method does identify the parameters associated with time-
varying regressors, but because civil liberties tend to vary very little and civil liberties for some
countries remain unchanged during the entire sample period, the identification strategy turns
out to have very little power.
In a hypothetical limiting case when civil liberties remain constant over the sample period,
the dyad-specific fixed effects method would fail to identify the effect of civil liberties on
refugee migration.
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Therefore, as the civil liberties dummies do not vary much over time, their effect on
refugee migration counts can be difficult to identify in general, and especially when the as-
sociation between refugee migration counts and civil liberties is likely to be weaker for the
destination countries than for origin countries.
Table 1.3 reports the exponential regression estimates. The pooled Poisson-GMM esti-
mates use the 64,516 observations used in the pooled logarithmic regression in Table 1.2 plus
633,329 observations with zero counts for a total of 697,845 observations.
Compared with the pooled logarithmic regression, the pooled exponential regression esti-
mates are similar in terms of statistical significance.
The exponential regression includes many zero count observations and therefore the refer-
ence point, with respect to which dummy variable coefficients are to be interpreted, is different
from that of the logarithmic regression.
This may explain why the pooled exponential regression results in larger parameter esti-
mates for conflict and civil liberties at the origin country.
Table 1.3 reports fixed effects Poisson estimates. As far as we know, there is no known
method to adjust standard errors of the fixed effects Poisson maximum likelihood estimation
method for dyadic correlation patterns, thus, we report bootstrapped standard errors.
The fixed effects Poisson method restricts the analysis to all those dyads with at least one
positive count during the sample period. Thus, it restricts the sample depending on the values
of the dependent variable.
As in the logarithmic regression, the Poisson fixed-effects method fails to identify the
effect of time invariant covariates, and for those covariates that vary little, like the conflict
indicators, the identification strategy is very weak.
As a result, conflict at the origin country is not a significant determinant of refugee counts,
a finding that goes against intuition and previous empirical evidence. Similarly, some of the
civil liberties dummies, both at the origin and destination countries, lose significance.
Table 1.3 also reports the PSM-GMM estimates. PSM-GMM estimates account for unob-
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served heterogeneity by using pre-sample averages of the dependent variable as proxies for
the unobserved heterogeneity.
Although it was not originally designed for dyadic data, we tailor it for use with dyadic
data.
In particular, we use the pre-sample average of the number of refugees with a specific
origin country during the 1951-1989 period, prior to the estimation period, as a proxy for the
unobserved origin-specific heterogeneity.
Similarly, we use the pre-sample mean of the number of refugees with a specific destina-
tion country during the 1951-1989 period as a proxy for the unobserved destination-specific
heterogeneity. These proxy measures of origin and destination-specific sources of heterogene-
ity are then included as regressors in the exponential mean equation.
As the pre-sample means enter the exponential function in logarithms, the sample is re-
stricted to the 244,710 observations with positive pre-sample means.
Therefore, the PSM-GMM estimation does not include observations on countries with no
pre-sample refugee counts (either as origin or destination) including newly created countries
that did not exist during the pre-sample period.
Note, however, that the PSM-GMM estimator restricts the sample in a more natural way
than the logarithmic regression and the Poisson fixed effects estimator. It restricts the esti-
mation sample to those dyads corresponding to origin and destination countries with at least
one positive refugee count during the period prior to the estimation sample, allowing for zero
counts during the estimation sample.
Thus, censoring occurs depending on the value of a predetermined variable. Instead, the
logarithmic regression constrains the sample to those dyad observations with positive refugee





































Table 1.3: Exponential mean specification
Pooled-Poisson Fixed Effects Poisson PSM-GMM
Origin Destination Origin Destination Origin Destination
Log - Population -0.0084 0.5233*** -2.3180* 1.4759 0.0297 0.3710***
(0.0880) (0.0864) (1.3820) (1.0747) (0.1150) (0.0744)
Conflict 1.2041*** 0.3905 0.2457 -0.0981 0.8361*** -0.1179
(0.2938) (0.3371) (0.1672) (0.1119) (0.2828) (0.1705)
Civil Liberties_2 3.3799*** -2.0900*** 0.9003** -1.5693*** 2.6073*** -1.9438***
(0.5493) (0.2898) (0.3723) (0.4619) (0.5572) (0.4555)
Civil Liberties_3 3.6004*** -2.2667*** 0.6259 -1.4911*** 3.1302*** -1.5686***
(0.5608) (0.4419) (0.5157) (0.5589) (0.4918) (0.3647)
Civil Liberties_4 4.2982*** -1.9258*** 1.2112** -1.1585** 3.8361*** -1.7197***
(0.6131) (0.4267) (0.5556) (0.5684) (0.5325) (0.3084)
Civil Liberties_5 4.7430*** -1.6836*** 1.4459** -0.8734 3.9548*** -1.7895***
(0.5730) (0.4730) (0.6620) (0.6683) (0.5236) (0.3461)
Civil Liberties_6 5.4198*** -1.6599*** 1.6382** -0.6544 4.3752*** -1.8666***
(0.6146) (0.4891) (0.6662) (0.7345) (0.5056) (0.0832)
Civil Liberties_7 5.9283*** -1.8781*** 1.3129 -0.3986 4.7791*** -1.8465***
(0.7693) (0.4766) (0.8179) (0.8153) (0.5650) (0.1430)
Log - GDP pc -0.5525*** 0.2130 -0.9758*** 0.4051 -0.1970 0.2371*
(0.1649) (0.2505) (0.2167) (0.3505) (0.1422) (0.1406)












Observations 697,845 133,137 244,710
Countries 178 178 178 163 97 112
Dyads 31,507 5,868 10,793
Pseudo R-squared 0.6360 0.7276
All regressions include year dummies. Two-way clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
One, two and three starts stand for 10, 5 and 1 per cent significance levels.
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The PSM-GMM estimates associated with conflict and civil liberties at the origin country
are somewhat smaller than the corresponding pooled Poisson estimates. Statistical signifi-
cance of PSM-GMM estimates is similar to the pooled Poisson case with the exception that
GDP per capita, which turns out to be significant at the destination, but not at the origin coun-
try.
As argued in the introduction, one of the contributions of this chapter is to report two-
way clustered standard errors as opposed to the previous literature, which uses dyad-clustered
standard errors.
For comparison, Tables 1.4 and 1.5 report the same regressions as Tables 1.2 and 1.3, but
using dyad-clustered standard errors. Therefore, parameter estimates are identical in the two
sets of Tables, they differ in the standard errors.
We first focus on the logarithmic specification. Two-way clustered standard errors are
much larger than the dyad-clustered standard errors, and are sometimes up to about three times
larger. As a result, some covariates lose statistical significance when assessing significance
with two-way clustered standard errors in Table 1.2.
For instance, GDP per capita at the destination country loses significance in the pooled
regression with the logarithmic specification and population and conflict at the destination
country lose significance in the fixed effects case.
Turning to the pooled exponential regression, two-way clustered standard errors are up to
30 per cent larger in Table 1.3 than in Table 1.5, but in some cases are even smaller than the
dyad-clustered standard errors.
It seems that the issue of using two-way clustered standard errors instead of dyad-clustered
standard errors is much more important when using the logarithmic specification.
With the exponential specification, statistical significance is almost unchanged qualita-
tively, only GDP per capita at the destination country becomes marginally significant with the
two-way clustered standard errors.
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Table 1.4: Logarithmic specification with dyad-clustered standard errors
(1) (2)
Pooled Dyad Fixed Effects
Origin Destination Origin Destination
Log - Population 0.1621*** 0.4911*** 0.9390*** -0.9646***
(0.0207) (0.0251) (0.2316) (0.3050)
Conflict 0.6271*** 0.0773 0.0652*** 0.1821***
(0.0574) (0.0935) (0.0244) (0.0638)
Civil Liberties_2 1.3163*** -1.5101*** 0.8151*** -0.2992***
(0.1295) (0.0772) (0.1348) (0.0621)
Civil Liberties_3 1.4540*** -1.9193*** 1.2496*** -0.2355**
(0.1411) (0.1056) (0.1646) (0.0931)
Civil Liberties_4 1.6242*** -1.8961*** 1.3541*** 0.0128
(0.1381) (0.1240) (0.1719) (0.1099)
Civil Liberties_5 1.8572*** -1.8873*** 1.5036*** -0.0770
(0.1351) (0.1321) (0.1768) (0.1435)
Civil Liberties_6 2.2289*** -1.6760*** 1.5959*** -0.0991
(0.1439) (0.1915) (0.1841) (0.1690)
Civil Liberties_7 2.4175*** -1.3430*** 1.7728*** 0.1627
(0.1640) (0.3061) (0.2022) (0.2473)
Log - GDP pc -0.2048*** 0.1293*** -0.9226*** -0.2351
(0.0290) (0.0454) (0.0986) (0.1767)











Number of countries 178 163 178 163
# dyads 5,868 5,868
R-squared 0.2818
All regressions include year dummies. Standard errors clustered at the dyad.
One, two and three starts stand for 10, 5 and 1 per cent significance levels.
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Table 1.5: Exponential mean specification with dyad-clustered standard errors
(1) (2)
Pooled Pre-Sample Mean GMM
Origin Destination Origin Destination
Log - Population -0.0084 0.5233*** 0.0297 0.3710***
(0.0697) (0.0851) (0.0854) (0.0998)
Conflict 1.2041*** 0.3905 0.8361*** -0.1179
(0.2357) (0.2577) (0.2242) (0.1910)
Civil Liberties_2 3.3799*** -2.0900*** 2.6073*** -1.9438***
(0.4813) (0.3662) (0.5591) (0.2865)
Civil Liberties_3 3.6004*** -2.2667*** 3.1302*** -1.5686***
(0.4882) (0.4473) (0.5821) (0.4396)
Civil Liberties_4 4.2982*** -1.9258*** 3.8361*** -1.7197***
(0.4909) (0.4308) (0.5598) (0.3913)
Civil Liberties_5 4.7430*** -1.6836*** 3.9548*** -1.7895***
(0.4489) (0.4048) (0.5565) (0.3830)
Civil Liberties_6 5.4198*** -1.6599*** 4.3752*** -1.8666***
(0.4521) (0.5598) (0.5538) (0.4825)
Civil Liberties_7 5.9283*** -1.8781*** 4.7791*** -1.8465***
(0.5957) (0.5045) (0.5825) (0.4346)
Log-GDP pc PPP -0.5525*** 0.2130 -0.1970 0.2371
(0.1303) (0.1999) (0.1327) (0.1487)




Comm. language -0.3577 -0.2150
(0.3968) (0.3470)
Former colonizer -0.7459 -0.4637
(0.5107) (0.4332)




# observations 697,845 244,710
# countries 178 178 97 112
# dyads 31,507 10,793
Pseudo-R2 0.6360 0.7276
All regressions include year dummies. Standard errors clustered at the dyad in parentheses.
One, two and three starts stand for 10, 5 and 1 per cent significance levels.
1.7 Robustness checks
A first robustness check involves how we measure conflict and civil liberties. In other words,
we wonder whether the results obtained are robust to the way we measure the covariates. The
binary conflict indicator bundles together conflict episodes of varying magnitude or intensity.
To see how conflict intensity affects the number of refugees who leave their country of ori-
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gin or go to a destination country, we replace the binary indicator with a measure of intensity
of each conflict from the Center of Systemic Peace, the ACTOTAL score.
This indicator takes values from 0, which indicates no conflict, 1 meaning a small scale
conflict, up to 14, the bloodiest degree of conflict. Some of these categories are empty and
some include very few conflict episodes.
Following the procedure explained in Appendix A, we recoded this indicator into nine
levels of intensity. Similarly, the civil liberties score, is replaced by a 21-level democracy in-
dicator, the POLITY2 score also from the Center of Systemic Peace. The resulting regressions
are too big to be displayed in a Table.
Instead, we report the results in a graph. We only report the PSM-GMM estimates to save
space.
Figure 1.5 plots parameter estimates and their ninety-five per cent confidence intervals.
Statistical significance of parameter estimates can be easily assessed in the graph by checking
if the confidence interval includes the x-axis.
Population at the origin country is not statistically significantly different from zero. The
reference or left-out group corresponds to a country of origin and a country of destination
experiencing no conflict and having the highest standards of democracy.
Therefore, the positive values of the parameter estimates associated with the conflict in-
tensity dummies indicate higher number of refugees than the reference group.
With one exception, as the intensity of conflict in the origin country increases, the asso-
ciated coefficients also increase, although not uniformly, and are significant. All the autoc-
racy/democracy dummies, corresponding to the origin country, have positive and significant
parameter estimates.
As the level of autocracy decreases or democracy increases, the associated parameter esti-
mates decrease although not uniformly. This indicates that higher standards of democracy at
the source country reduce the flow of forced migrants.
GDP per capita at the origin country has a negative and significant effect on the number
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of refugees that flee that country.This result is in contrast with that reported in Table 1.3 using
the PSM-GMM method. When accounting for conflict intensity and a more detailed classi-
fication of democracy levels, refugee counts decrease with the GDP per capita of the source
country. Population at the destination country has a positive and significant effect. This can
mean that populous countries receive more refugees. Two of the conflict intensity dummies
for the destination country are negative and significant, and the others are insignificant. Thus,
conflict at the destination country does not have a clear effect on refugee migration. All the
autocracy/democracy dummies at the destination country have a negative parameter estimate
and all but three are statistically significant. Although there is not a uniform pattern for these
parameter estimates, less democratic/more autocratic countries tend to host fewer refugees.
GDP per capita at the destination countries is statistically insignificant. Distance between
origin and destination countries significantly reduces forced migration counts. Sharing a com-
mon border significantly increases the flows, while sharing language and the former colonizer
indicator do not increase the flows. Overall, the results obtained are similar to those reported


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Parameter estimate 95% confidence interval
Origin Destination
Figure 1.5: Gravity Regression, PSM-GMM estimates with multilevel Conflict and Polity indicators using as references origin and
destination countries with no conflict and the highest standards of democracy.
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As a second robustness check, we look at how sensible the PSM-GMM estimator is to
changing the pre-sample period. Arguably, the pre-sample period used, 1951 to 1989, corre-
sponds to the Cold War, during which the determinants of forced migration may be different
from those of the 1990-2013 period used for estimation.
Is the PSM-GMM method robust to using different pre-sample periods? To shed light on
this issue, we perform two sensitivity tests, based on two alternative pre-sample periods; from
1951 to 2001, which includes the Cold War but also extends beyond, and from 1992 to 2001,
which does not include the Cold War period. Thus, the estimation sample is shortened in both
cases to the 2002-2013 period. The results of this sensitivity analysis are reported in Table
1.6. The PSM-GMM estimator restricts the analysis to those countries for which there is at
least one positive count during the pre-sample period.
As the two pre-sample periods in Table 1.6 include the 1990s, when the number of dyads
with positive counts increased significantly, the results reported in Table 1.6 include more
countries, dyads and observations than those reported in Table 1.3 for the PSM-GMM.
Qualitatively, the results reported in Table 1.6 are very similar to those previously reported
in Table 1.3 for the PSM-GMM, the only difference is that conflict at the source country
is somewhat less significant. We believe that this result is due to the sample period used,
rather than the pre-sample mean; the shorter, 2002-2013, sample period includes many more
counts of refugees between conflict-free countries, which results in the conflict indicator losing
significance. Quantitatively, the results in Table 1.6 are also very similar to those for the
sample and pre-sample periods used in the previous section (Table 1.5, PSM-GMM columns).
The only difference is that parameter estimates associated with civil liberties in the origin
country are now slightly smaller, while those estimates associated with civil liberties in the
destination country are slightly bigger.
Again, we believe this quantitative differences are due to the sample period used, which in-
cludes many more positive refugee counts for dyads involving conflict-free countries, thereby
assigning a quantitatively more important role to civil liberties.
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Table 1.6: Pre-Sample Mean GMM estimates for different pre-sample periods
Pre-Sample Period 1951-2001 1992-2001
Origin Destination Origin Destination
Log - Population 0.0960 0.3861*** 0.1379 0.3749***
(0.1098) (0.0875) (0.0961) (0.0806)
Conflict 0.7088** 0.0670 0.5485* 0.0129
(0.3139) (0.2535) (0.2976) (0.2396)
Civil Liberties_2 2.4864*** -2.0911*** 2.4483*** -2.0750***
(0.6021) (0.5665) (0.6056) (0.5365)
Civil Liberties_3 2.5637*** -1.7160*** 2.2384*** -1.8335***
(0.5773) (0.4718) (0.5875) (0.3996)
Civil Liberties_4 3.2428*** -1.6460*** 2.9552*** -1.6709***
(0.7215) (0.3308) (0.6940) (0.3152)
Civil Liberties_5 3.1054*** -1.7351*** 2.6967*** -1.8364***
(0.5383) (0.4002) (0.5409) (0.4080)
Civil Liberties_6 3.4478*** -2.0422*** 3.0200*** -2.2793***
(0.5016) (0.2518) (0.4927) (0.3234)
Civil Liberties_7 4.0070*** -2.5257*** 3.4270*** -2.3537***
(0.5626) (0.5359) (0.5672) (0.6314)
Log - GDP pc -0.0084 0.1723 0.0014 0.1265
(0.1713) (0.1232) (0.1464) (0.1205)








Pre-Sample Mean 0.4632*** 0.3396** 0.5645*** 0.3748***




Countries 171 157 171 155
Dyads 26,692 26,352
Pseudo R-squared 0.7609 0.7763
The estimation period is in this Table shortened to 2002-2013. All regressions include year dummies.
Two-way clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
One, two and three starts stand for 10, 5 and 1 per cent significance levels.
1.8 Discussion and conclusions
This chapter contributes to the literature on forced migration in various respects. First, we use
a gravity model to analyze global force migration. Second, we analyze the persons of concern
data set from the UNHCR, a database that has previously received very little attention.
Third, we contribute to various methodological debates. On the one hand, we analyze the
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effect of omitting zero forced migration counts. In our research, including the zeros is tanta-
mount to using an exponential mean specification and omitting them to using a logarithmic
specification.
In general, omitting the zeros results in parameter estimates that indicate a smaller impact
of some of the explanatory variables on refugee counts. This difference is found to be re-
lated to the reference point with respect to which the effect is measured. On the other hand,
we contribute to the debate about whether it is more appropriate to account for unobserved
heterogeneity via fixed-effects or rely on the pooled specification.
We show how ignoring unobserved heterogeneity might be an example of “dirty pooling”
and how accounting for it by means of fixed effects regressions might be like “throwing out the
baby with the bath water”. The PSM-GMM stands out in this research as a method that can ac-
commodate the presence of zeros and account for unobserved heterogeneity while identifying
the effect of time-invariant covariates.
Fourth, the empirical evidence reported in this chapter makes use of the recently developed
methods to estimate standard errors that are robust to dyadic correlation. We find evidence sug-
gesting that previous findings based on underestimated standard errors remain after properly
adjusting standard errors.
For instance, conflict and absence of civil liberties in the country of origin have been found
elsewhere to be fundamental determinants of forced migration and the evidence reported in
this chapter using two-way clustered robust standard errors corroborates this finding.
Our evidence also supports the hypothesis that distance and sharing a common border
between origin and destination countries are fundamental determinants of forced migration.
However, contrary to previously reported evidence, sharing a common language does not seem
to influence refugee migration, nor does being a former colonizer influence the count in a
significant manner.
Our more substantive finding is the significant influence of the level of civil liberties in the
destination country on the number of refugees it receives, a channel not documented before.
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Forced migration has lately been in the news as a consequence of the recent exodus from Syria.
Thus, there is no need to highlight the importance of this phenomenon and how politicians
desperately need to apply policy measures to accommodate such a shock.
The empirical evidence reported in this chapter has some important policy implications.
Policy measures to cope with forced migration could be directed to its determinant factors.
However, there is little that politicians can do to influence the distance between origin and
destination countries or any of the other dyadic determinants, so the only alternative is to
influence the incidence of conflict and level of civil liberties or democracy either at the source
or destination countries.
For the destination countries, no sane politician would be willing to trade civil liberties or
incidence of conflict for a lower inflow of forced migrants. But the risk exists that radicals
could direct efforts to reduce the standards of civil liberties to lower the inflow of refugees.
Therefore, the only alternative is to fight the refugee problem by making source countries
conflict-free with improved standards of civil liberties.
1.9 Appendix A: Data sources of Chapter 1
The data set compiled is a blend of the following data sets:
1. Persons of concern Dataset. United Nations High Commissioner for the Refugees (UN-
HCR). Time frame: 1960-2014. Variables used: Refugees.
Availability: http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/time_series
2. Armed Conflict Dataset. Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Uppsala University /
Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). Time frame: 1946-2014. Variables used: Loca-
tion. The name(s) of the country/countries whose government(s) have a primary claim
to the issue in dispute. Year of observation. The date when the conflict activity reached
25 battle-related deaths in a year. The date when conflict activity ended.
Availability: https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/
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3. Freedom in the World Dataset. Freedom House. Time frame: 1972-2015. Variables
used: Civil Liberties. Availability: https://freedomhouse.org
4. POLITY IV and MAJOR EPISODES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE (MEPV) Datasets.
Center for Systemic Peace. Time frame: 1960-2014. Variables used: POLITY2 (Re-
vised Combined Polity Score). ACTOTAL: Total summed magnitudes of all (societal
and interstate). Integer-valued scale ranging from 0 to 14. Transformed into a 0-8 scale
by grouping categories (7, 8 and 9) and (10, 11, 12, 13 and 14) of the original scale into
categories 7 and 8 of the new one.
Availability: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html
5. Geographical and Distance dataset. CEPII, SciencesPo Department of Economics. Dyadic
data set. Variables used: Contiguous countries indicator. Simple distance (most pop-
ulated cities, km). Common official language indicator. Colonizer: dummy variable
which takes value equal to 1 if country of destination has ever been colonizer of the
country of origin (a transformation of the original colony variable).
Availability: http://econ.sciences-po.fr/staff/thierry-mayer





A spatial model of internal displacement
and forced migration
Abstract
This chapter develops a spatial model of internal and external forced migration. We propose
a model reminiscent of Hotelling’s spatial model in economics and Schelling’s model of seg-
regation. Conflict is modeled as a shock that hits a country at certain location and generates
displacement of people located near the shock’s location. Some displaced people cross a
border, thus becoming refugees, while others remain as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).
The model delivers predictions about how the fractions of a country’s population that become
refugees and IDPs ought to be related with the intensity of the shock, country size, terrain
ruggedness and the degree of geographical proximity of the country with respect to the rest of
the world. The predictions of the model are then tested against real data using a panel of 200
countries covering the period 1960-2016. The empirical evidence is broadly in line with the
predictions of the model.
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2.1 Introduction
Forced displacement occurs when a group of people are obliged to leave their home location
unwillingly. Instead, economic migrants choose to leave their home in search of economic op-
portunities. Forcibly displaced persons can be classified into several groups depending on the
root cause of displacement and whether they cross an international border or not. This chap-
ter focuses on two groups of forcibly displaced persons: refugees and Internally Displaced
Persons (IDPs).
According to the 1951 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Refugee
Convention and the 1967 Protocol (UNHCR 2011), a refugee is someone who “owing to a
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is
unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”
The 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention (UNHCR 2006) extended the defini-
tion to include those who escape from origin countries because of “acts of external aggression,
occupation, domination by foreign powers or serious disturbances of public order.”
The UNHCR defines IDPs as those “...who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave
their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid
the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights
or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized
State border” according to the original definition agreed upon at the United Nations in 1998,
e.g. Kälin (2008).
According to these definitions, forced displacement can be caused by armed conflict, lack
of civil liberties or political rights and natural disasters. However, internal and external dis-
placement share a common cause: armed conflict. When we focus on displaced people who
escape from armed conflict, the distinguishing feature between refugees and IDPs is whether
they cross an international border.
As refugees and IDPs have a common cause it seems logical to study both groups of people
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simultaneously. However, the literature on forced displacement is mainly divided into refugee
studies on the one hand and internal displacement studies on the other.
In this chapter, we develop a theoretical model where armed conflict is the common cause
of internal and external forced migration.
We propose a spatial model of internal displacement and forced migration which has no
predecessor in the literature of forced migration. Our model is reminiscent of Hotelling’s spa-
tial market model (Hotelling, 1929) and Schelling’s model of segregation (Schelling, 1971).
As in Hotelling’s model, population is uniformly distributed in a segment of the real line.
As in Schelling’s model, people change their location according to the dynamics of the model.
The spatial model we develop represents armed conflict as a shock that takes place at a partic-
ular location and generates a migration flow.
Some displaced people cross a border, thus becoming refugees, while others remain as
IDPs. We abstract from other known causes of internal and external forced migration, such as
lack of civil liberties or political rights, economic development and natural disasters.1
The model predicts how the number of refugees and IDPs, as a fraction of a country’s
population, varies with the intensity of armed conflict and geographical covariates such as
country size, orography and distance to other countries.
In our model, armed conflict has a causal effect on displacement, and the geographical
variables exert an effect modification on displacement.
One of the effect modifiers we study is physical country size, i.e. area. Basic intuition
indicates that the area of a country must necessarily be a determinant in the fraction of the
population affected by a conflict of a particular magnitude.
For instance, in a very large country, a conflict might generate a certain amount of internal
displacement of affected people to other parts of the country and no refugees.
However, a conflict of similar magnitude in a sufficiently smaller country would generate
1Although the model focuses on conflict-induced displacement, it could describe displacement induced by
natural disasters. The only difference would be that those who cross a border would be externally displaced, but
according to the definitions given above, would not be refugees.
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an outflow or refugees to neighboring countries. A second geographical covariate of interest
is the orography. Intuition suggests that displacement should be easier the flatter and obstacle-
free a country is, while displacement ought to be much more difficult in a highly mountainous
country.
Thus, as a result of a conflict of a particular magnitude, the rougher the orography, the less
the displaced people ought to move, hence potentially generating a lower number of refugees.
A third geographical variable analyzed is distance to neighboring countries.
Intuition suggests that the more distant neighboring countries are, the lower the number of
refugees while total displacement should be independent of the distance. Summarizing, in the
model, armed conflict generates displacement while country size, orography and distance to
other countries determine the division of displacement into refugees and IDPs.
We develop a barebones model intentionally, with the aim of keeping the mathematical
analysis as simple as possible. Due to its simplicity, the model allows for a number of exten-
sions at the cost of more complicated analysis.
In addition, this chapter contributes empirical evidence by testing the predictions of the
model against real data. The empirics use a panel data set of 200 countries covering the period
1960-2016. This data set includes country of origin refugee and IDP counts, conflict and
geographical data.
We exploit the cross country variation in the geographical variables to analyze their effect
modification. In addition, we also account for non-spatial variables which our model ignores,
but the literature has found relevant, such as the lack of civil liberties or political rights and
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. The evidence obtained is in line with the model’s
predictions.
The next section reviews the literature and indicates the contribution of this chapter to
it. Section 2.3 develops a spatial model of internal and external displacement. Section 2.4
describes the empirical methods, the data used and reports the empirical evidence. Section 2.5
sums up the main conclusions.
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2.2 Literature review and our contribution
The literature on forced displacement is divided into two areas: refugee and IDP studies. A
fundamental reason for this divide in the literature is data availability. Refugee destination
countries keep track of asylum applications which generate data which can be used to analyze
the choice of destination, e.g. Havinga and Böcker (1999), Neumayer (2005a) and Neumayer
(2005b).
Other studies analyze dyadic forced displacement flows between countries, e.g. Iqbal
(2007), Moore and Shellman (2007b), Barthel and Neumayer (2015) and Echevarria and
Gardeazabal (2016).
A stream of the literature builds on the consequences of refugee inflows in the host country.
Some explore the role of refugee flows in spreading conflict in the host country e.g. Salehyan
and Gleditsch (2006), Salehyan (2008), Milton et al. (2013), Rüegger (2019), Fisk (2019) and
Böhmelt et al. (2019).
Another arm focuses on the effect of refugee inflows on the host country’s contribution to
Official Development Assistance (ODA) (e.g. Czaika, 2009b), the UNHCR (e.g. Roper and
Barria, 2010) or UN peacekeeping missions (e.g. Uzonyi, 2015).
All previous references use cross-country data (either longitudinal or dyadic) to analyze
external displacement. However, a large number of articles are country case studies. Following
Card’s (1990) seminal article on the labor market consequences of a large immigration shock,
a literature has emerged, e.g. Borjas (2017), Peri and Yasenov (2019, forthcoming).
Similarly, large refugee inflows have prompted research analyzing their effect on the
host country’s food prices, wealth, labor market, health, education and other outcomes, e.g.
Alix-Garcia and Saah (2009), Baez (2011), Tumen (2016), Ceritoglu et al. (2017), Esen and
Oğuş Binatlı (2017), Akgündüz and Torun (2018) and Verme and Schuettler (2019).
Relatively less work has been done on the analysis of refugee outflows from origin coun-
tries. Davenport et al. (2003) analyzes the determinants of aggregate stocks of migrants,
whether internal or external, from origin countries.
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More recently, Dreher et al. (2019) analyze the effect of aid receipts on total refugee out-
flows and also on flows to donor countries. Our chapter analyzes refugee outflows, thus con-
tributing to this less prolific arm of the literature.
When we turn to the literature on internal displacement, we find country case studies. As
in refugee studies, there are quantitative assessments of the effect of displacement on host
communities. The massive conflict-induced internal displacement in Colombia has been the
focus of several articles.
Engel and Ibáñez (2007) and Ibáñez and Vélez (2008) study the determinants of displace-
ment. Morales (2018) studies the impact of displacement on wages in the host communi-
ties. Depetris-Chauvin and Santos (2018) analyze the effect of internal displacement on rental
prices in host cities.
McEniry et al. (2019) investigate the effect of exposure to displacement on older adults
health. Displacement determinants in Indonesia are analyzed in Czaika and Kis-Katos (2009).
Kondylis (2008) conducts a resettlement policy evaluation in Rwanda.
Kondylis (2010) assesses the labor market effect of displacement in Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina.
Alix-Garcia et al. (2012) study the price responses to internal displacement and aid in
Sudan. Alix-Garcia et al. (2013) estimate the effect of conflict-induced internal displacement
on spatial changes in land use.
The spread of conflict has also been studied in relation with internal displacement, e.g.
Bohnet et al. (2018).
Other country case studies analyze not only conflict-originated displacement but also in-
ternal displacement caused by natural disasters and economic development e.g. Lanjouw et al.
(2000), Muggah (2003) and Fernandes (2017).
There are also a few policy analyses Goswami (2007), Lischer (2008), Crisp (2010) and
Munive (2019), and also applications of the interview-research methodology, e.g. Ayata and
Yukseker (2005).
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However, to the best of our knowledge, there is not a single cross-country study on internal
displacement. We carry out a cross country empirical analysis of forced internal displacement,
thus contributing evidence on this previously unexplored angle.
Theoretical studies of displacement are scant in the literature. A notable exception is
Czaika (2009b) who models refugee migration decisions and studies the distribution of bur-
dens from forced migration across countries. Therefore, our model is a contribution in a field
with scarce production of theoretical models.
Furthermore, the model designed below builds a bridge between internal and external
forced migration. As far as we know, simultaneous modeling of internal and external forced
migration has not been attempted before.
Indeed, armed conflict generates displacement. Ball et al. (2002) is perhaps the single
most clear example showing the relation between conflict and displacement. Their study of
the 1998-1999 conflict in Kosovo shows how displacement counts mirror conflict intensity
measured as the number of people killed.
Our model takes the relation between conflict and displacement as granted and analyzes
how geographical variables affect displacement, both internally and externally. The literature
includes previous studies where geographical factors play a role in determining displacement
flows.
In particular, the influence of distance between countries has been incorporated into empir-
ical models of dyadic refugee counts, either through spatial dependence as in Barthel and Neu-
mayer (2015) or directly as in the gravity models of Iqbal (2007) or Echevarria and Gardeaz-
abal (2016). However, the roles of country size and ruggedness of terrain have not been
explored before.
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2.3 A spatial model of forced migration
For expositional purposes, first we analyze a baseline version of the model with no spatial
variables involved in subsection 2.3. This version of the model is the easiest possible and
allows us to understand its mechanics. Then, subsection 2.3.1 develops a more sophisticated
version of the model where we include the spatial variables and see how they interact with
conflict in the determination of displacement.
The baseline model
This section develops a spatial model to explain conflict induced displacement. Three coun-
tries, A, B and C, align in the real line. Country A is located to the left of the the origin,
country B is located in the interval [0,1] and country C to the right of unity. Points 0 and 1 are
the borders.
We will focus on country B, whose population is uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
A shock of size s hits country B at location ls, a point in the unit interval. Figure 2.1 shows






Figure 2.1: Countries A, B and C are located in the real line. Points 0 and 1 are the borders.
The shock takes place at location ls.
The shock affects citizens of country B forcing them to leave their home location if the
benefits from staying are lower or equal than the costs. Remaining at their home location
yields a benefit b for every citizen, while the cost of staying is
c(s, li, ls) = s−|li − ls| , (2.1)
where s is the size of the shock, li, the location of individual i, and ls is the location of the
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shock. In words, the cost of staying equals the size of the shock minus the distance from the
location of the individual to the location of the shock.
For simplicity, we normalize the benefit of staying to zero. Under these assumptions,
individuals whose distance to the shock location is less than the size of the shock are displaced.
We assume the intensity of the shock, s, ranges from 0 to 1. Notice that a shock whose
intensity is equal to 1 would affect the entire population. Therefore, it seems unnecessary to
analyze larger shocks. We also assume that there is no international spillover of armed conflict
and therefore the shock only affects citizens of country B.
Hence, in those cases where ls − s is negative or ls + s is greater than unity, those who
decide to move are in the intersection of [ls − s, ls + s] and the unit interval. Depending on
whether ls − s is positive or negative and ls + s is smaller or greater than unity, the proportion
















ls = 1− s
Figure 2.2: Four regions in the shock intensity and shock location space. Total displacement
is different in each of these regions. Notice that the two lines cross at s = 0.5.
Region 1 corresponds to the case where ls− s ≥ 0 and ls+ s ≤ 1 and represented in Figure
2.3. Under these conditions, the proportion of people displaced equals 2s, the length of the
63
2.3. A SPATIAL MODEL OF FORCED MIGRATION CHAPTER 2. A SPATIAL MODEL
segment [ls − s, ls + s]. Within region 2, and as shown in Figure 2.4, ls + s ≤ 1 and ls − s < 0,
so the shock affects everyone located to the left of ls and displaced people are a fraction ls + s
of the population. In Region 3, ls − s ≥ 0 and ls + s > 1, so displaced people are a fraction
1− (ls − s) of the population, as captured by Figure 2.5. Finally, in Region 4, ls − s < 0 and
ls+s>, so every person is affected and the proportion of displaced people equals 1. Therefore,


















2s i f ls ≥ s & ls ≤ 1− s
ls + s i f ls < s & ls ≤ 1− s
1− (ls− s) i f ls ≥ s & ls > 1− s
1 i f ls < s & ls > 1− s
(2.2)
Notice that total displacement is a continuous function of the shock’s intensity and loca-
tion, and non-differentiable at the boundaries between regions. Under the assumptions laid
out so far, the model predicts the proportion of the population displaced as a function of shock
intensity and location.
With no further assumptions, the model gives no indication as to how far displaced persons
move. For simplicity, we assume that displaced persons move a distance equal to the size of
the shock, either leftward or rightward depending on which side of the shock location they
are.
This form of displacement is consistent with a story where at each point in the line to
the left of ls − s or the right of ls + s, a person not affected by the shock hosts one, and only
one, displaced person. As a consequence of people’s displacement, some might cross a border
becoming refugees while others remain in the home country as IDPs.
More precisely, those people whose distance to a border is less than the size of the shock
become refugees. For the time being, we will assume that crossing a border is cost-less and
relax this assumption in Section 2.3.1.
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0 ls − s ls ls + s 1
2s
Figure 2.3: A shock of intensity s hits Country B at location ls. Those in the interval
[ls− s, ls + s] are affected by the shock. Total displacement is 2s.
0 ls ls + s 1
ls + s
Figure 2.4: A shock of intensity s hits Country B at location ls. Those in the interval [0, ls+ s]
are affected by the shock. Total displacement is ls + s.
0 ls − s ls 1
1− (ls − s)
Figure 2.5: A shock of intensity s hits Country B at location ls. Those in the interval [ls − s,1]
are affected by the shock. Total displacement is 1− (ls − s).
Figure 2.6 sorts (s, ls)-pairs into nine regions depending of their position with respect to
four lines.




















ls = 1− s
ls = 1−2s
Figure 2.6: Areas of internal and external displacement
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Region 1 is further described in Figure 2.7, where the shock affects everyone in interval
[ls − s, ls + s]. Those in the interval [ls − s, ls) move to [ls −2s, ls − s) and those initially in the
interval [ls, ls + s] move to (ls+ s, ls +2s].
Because ls > 2s, no one leaves the country through the border with country A, and as
ls < 1−2s, no one crosses the border with country C. As a consequence, everyone affected by
the shock remains internally displaced.
Figure 2.8 represents Region 2 where, as in the previous case, no one reaches the border
to Country A, while a fraction ls + 2s− 1 of the population reaches Country C and become
refugees.
Figure 2.9 represents Region 3 where all people affected to the right side of ls, the fraction
1− ls of the population, become refugees while those affected to the left of ls remain as IDPs.
0 lS −2s ls − s ls ls + s ls +2s 1
Figure 2.7: A shock of intensity s hits Country B at location ls. Those in the interval [ls − s, ls)
move to [ls−2s, ls − s) and those in the interval [ls, ls+ s] move to [ls+ s, ls +2s]. There are no
flows of refugees between Country B and either Country A or C. All displaced people remain
as IDPs.
0 lS −2s ls − s ls ls + s ls +2s1
Figure 2.8: A shock of intensity s hits Country B at location ls. Those in the interval
[ls− s, ls) move to [ls −2s, ls− s) remaining as IDPs. Those in the interval [ls, ls+ s] move
to [ls + s, ls +2s]. A fraction ls+2s−1 of the population crosses the border to Country C, thus
becoming refugees, and a fraction 1− ls− s of the population remains as IDPs.
0 lS −2s ls − s ls 1 2− ls
Figure 2.9: A shock of intensity s hits Country B at location ls. Those in the interval [ls − s, ls)
move to [ls −2s, ls− s) remaining as IDPs. Those in the interval [ls,1] move to [1,2− ls]. A
fraction 1− ls of the population crosses the border to Country C, thus becoming refugees.
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The reader is invited to carry out the same sort of reasoning for the remaining regions to


















































0 i f 0 < ls −2s < ls − s & ls + s < ls +2s < 1
ls +2s−1 i f 0 < ls −2s < ls − s & ls + s < 1 ≤ ls +2s
1− ls i f 0 < ls −2s < ls − s & 1 ≤ ls + s < ls +2s
2s− ls i f ls −2s ≤ 0 < ls − s & ls + s < ls +2s < 1
4s−1 i f ls −2s ≤ 0 < ls − s & ls + s < 1 ≤ ls +2s
2s+1−2ls i f ls −2s ≤ 0 < ls − s & 1 ≤ ls + s < ls +2s
ls i f ls −2s < ls− s ≤ 0 & ls + s < ls +2s < 1
2ls +2s−1 i f ls −2s < ls− s ≤ 0 & ls + s < 1 ≤ ls +2s
1 i f ls −2s < ls− s ≤ 0 & 1 ≤ ls + s < ls +2s
(2.3)
Once we know the proportion of the population displaced and the fraction of the population
that refugees represent, the fraction that remain internally displaced is computed as the differ-
ence.
This model delivers the fractions of internally and externally displaced populations as
functions of the location and the size of the shock.
However, in order to be able to use our model for empirical analysis, it is convenient to
integrate out the location variable. With this purpose, we assume the shock location is equally
likely to take place at any point in Country B.
Appendix 2.7 shows that, integrating over the shock location, we obtain the conditional
expectation of the fraction of people displaced, the fraction externally displaced and, by sub-
traction, the fraction internally displaced
Els [D |s] = s(2− s) i f s ∈ [0,1] (2.4)
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2s2 i f s ∈ [0,0.5]
4s−2s2−1 i f s ∈ (0.5,1]
(2.5)












s(2−3s) i f s ∈ [0,0.5]
s2 −2s+1 i f s ∈ (0.5,1]
(2.6)
Notice that, even though equations 2.2 and 2.3 are continuous but not differentiable func-
tions, integrating over the location removes the non differentiability. Figure 2.10 plots the
expected values of the proportions of displaced people, refugees and IDPs as continuous and
differentiable functions of the shock intensity. In its simplest form, the model delivers the
following results. First, both the expected values of the proportions of displaced persons and
refugees are increasing functions of the size of the shock. Second, the proportion of IDPs is
increasing in the size of the shock for small values of it, has a maximum at s = 1/3 and from
that point on it is decreasing in the size of the shock.




















Figure 2.10: Expected values of groups of people
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Finally, notice that these functions return fractions of population, thus the total number of
people displaced, the total number of refugees and the total number of IDPs can be obtained
multiplying these fractions by population. Therefore, population is in this model a natural
measure of exposure.
2.3.1 Country size, ruggedness and proximity
The model developed in the previous section assumes the armed conflict shock is the only
cause of displacement. In this section, we introduce various spatial variables into our analysis:
country size, ruggedness and proximity.
These variables are not causal forces of displacement but they modify the relationship
between the shock and displacement and have some bearing in determining how total dis-
placement splits into internal and external.
The area of a country plays an important role concerning internal and external displace-
ment. Intuitively, holding everything else constant, displaced people should find it easier to
escape from smaller countries. So far, the model has been developed under the assumption
that the size of the Country B is unity.
For simplicity, we assume that the largest country on earth has size unity and the other
countries are a fraction a of the largest. Therefore, we now assume that location ls ranges
from zero to a, a value lower than one. Stretching the language, we will refer to a as the
“area” of the country, despite the fact our model represents a country as a segment in the real
line.
Next we make two assumptions. First, we assume population is uniformly distributed in
the [0,a] segment, so the probability density function of population is 1/a at each location in
[0,a] and zero otherwise. Notice the difference between the standard concept of “population
density”, say the number of people per square kilometer, and the probability density of the
variable population, which describes how population is distributed within the country.
We assume the latter is uniformly distributed but say nothing about the former, that is, the
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country could have a high or a low “population density”. Second, without loss of generality,
the size of the shock is now assumed to lay in the interval [0,a]. Notice that a shock of size a
affects the entire population of the country, so it seems unnecessary to analyze larger shocks.
A geographical factor that affects internal and external displacement is the terrain rugged-
ness of the source country. Rugged source countries impose an extra difficulty for displace-
ment. Let r denote the degree of ruggedness of a country, a value in the unit interval, with
r = 0 for a perfectly flat country and r = 1 for an abrupt country highly inaccessible.
We assume that in a rugged country, a shock of size s forces people affected to move a
fraction γ of the distance displaced in the baseline model, that is, γs, where γ = γ(r), with
γ′ (r)< 0, so the fraction γ is decreasing in ruggedness.
In addition, we assume γ(0) = 1, so in a perfectly flat country, displaced persons move as
described in the baseline model. We also assume that 0 < γ(1) < 1, that is, in a country with
the highest ruggedness parameter, r = 1, the fraction γ is small but positive.
Distance between countries is another geographical factor of relevance for the analysis
of internal and external displacement. Intuitively, holding everything else constant, greater
distance between two countries ought to be associated with lower refugee flows.
However, the model analyzed in the previous section does not account for distance between
countries. In fact, the model assumes countries A, B and C are contiguous. Let us introduce
distance into the analysis. Let di j be the normalized distance between country i and country j,
with i, j = A,B,C.
Distance is normalized so that the longest distance between two countries equals unity.
However, we continue using the contiguous countries design and model distance between
countries as an iceberg-type cost. More specifically, out of all displaced people who reach the
border between countries i and j, the fraction that crosses the border is a decreasing function








< 0. This fraction equals
one when distance is zero, α(0) = 1, and is below one and positive when distance between
countries i and j is maximal, 0 < α(1)< 1.
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Modeling distance this way abstracts from whether countries are linked by land or nec-
essarily by sea. In addition, it could be argued that this iceberg-type cost associated with
crossing a border should be taken into account at the time of deciding whether to move or not.
However, the model assumes that the decision whether to move or not is independent of
the cost of crossing a border. The model also abstracts from asylum application costs and the
destination country stance towards refugees.




of those who reach the border between
countries i and j pile up at the border, in line with a real world observation. Under these

















2γs/a i f ls − γs ≥ 0 & ls+ γs ≤ a
(ls + γs)/a i f ls − γs < 0 & ls+ γs ≤ a
1− (ls − γs)/a i f ls − γs ≥ 0 & ls+ γs > a
1 i f ls − γs < 0 & ls+ γs > a
(2.7)























































0 i f 0 < ls −2γs < ls − γs & ls + γs < ls +2γs < a
αBC(ls +2γs−a)/a i f 0 < ls −2γs < ls − γs & ls + γs < a ≤ ls +2γs
αBC(a− ls)/a i f 0 < ls −2γs < ls − γs & a ≤ ls + γs < ls +2γs
αAB(2γs− ls)/a i f ls −2γs < 0 ≤ ls − γs & ls + γs < ls +2γs < a
[(2γs− ls)αAB +(ls +2γs−a)αBC]/a i f ls −2γs < 0 ≤ ls − γs & ls + γs < a ≤ ls +2γs
[(2γs− ls)αAB +(a− ls)αBC]/a i f ls −2γs < 0 ≤ ls − γs & a ≤ ls + γs < ls +2γs
αABls/a i f ls −2γs < ls − γs ≤ 0 & ls + γs < ls +2γs < a
[lsαAB +(ls +2γs−a)αBC]/a i f ls −2γs < ls − γs ≤ 0 & ls + γs < a ≤ ls +2γs
[lsαAB +(a− ls)αBC]/a i f ls −2γs < ls − γs ≤ 0 & a ≤ ls + γs < ls +2γs
(2.8)
Notice that total displacement depends on how many people are affected by the shock and it
does not depend on whether they cross a border or not. Therefore, total displacement does
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not depend on distance. However, the fraction of country B’s population that become refugees
does depend on distance.
Appendix 2.7 shows how integrating out the location variable the expected values of total
displacement, refugees and IDPs are
Els[D |s,a,r,dAB,dBC] = (2aγs− γ2s2)/a2 i f s ∈ [0,a]













2 i f s ∈ [0,a/2]
(2aγs− γ2s2 −a2/2)(αAB+αBC)/a2 i f s ∈ (a/2,a]












[2aγs− γ2s2 − γ2s2 (αAB +αBC)]/a2 i f s ∈ [0,a/2]
[2aγs− γ2s2 − (2aγs− γ2s2 −a2/2)(αAB +αBC)]/a2 i f s ∈ (a/2,a]
where the expected values of the relevant fractions are conditional on the size of the shock,
area, ruggedness and distances to neighboring countries. Notice that the term PB = αAB+αBC
can be interpreted as a measure of proximity.
Appendix 2.7 shows the derivatives of the expected value of the proportions of refugees,
internally displaced and total displacement with respect to area, ruggedness and proximity.
The signs of these derivatives indicate that the fraction of the population displaced responds
negatively to the area and ruggedness while it is unrelated to proximity.
The proportion of refugees also responds negatively to area and ruggedness, but it is posi-
tively related with proximity. However, the signs of the derivatives of the proportion of IDPs
with respect to area, ruggedness and proximity depend on the magnitude of the size of the
shock, area, proximity and ruggedness in a complex manner.
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2.4 The data, empirical methods and evidence
2.4.1 The econometric methods
The dependent variables analyzed are total displacement, total number of refugees and IDPs.
We use lagged population as exposure, therefore the dependent variable is the fraction of the
population that refugees (respectively, IDPs or total displacement) represent.
The expected value of the fraction of a country’s population that become refugees (respec-
tively, IDPs or displaced) is assumed to be an exponential function of a vector of covariates.
The exponential regression functions are estimated by the Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM), which is numerically identical to the pooled Poisson maximum likelihood estimator.
We will term this estimator as Pooled-GMM.
However, the Pooled-GMM estimator does not account for unobserved heterogeneity. Ac-
counting for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity via country of origin fixed effects cannot
simultaneously identify the effect of magnitudes such as area or terrain roughness which are
time invariant.
Thus, even though our empirical evidence is based on a panel data set, we cannot resort
to using the popular fixed effects methodology, which would preclude inference about time
invariant covariates, such as area, ruggedness and proximity. Instead, we use the Pre-Sample
Mean Generalized Method of Moments (PSM-GMM) suggested by Blundell et al. (2002).
The PSM-GMM estimation method is like the Pooled-GMM only that it includes an ad-
ditional regressor: the average value of the dependent variable during a period prior to the
sample period.
The pre-sample mean of the dependent variable is used as a proxy for the unobserved
heterogeneity. As the dependent variable is measured as a fraction of the population, the
pre-sample mean is also measured as a fraction of the population.
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2.4.2 The data
Variable definitions and data sources are shown in Appendix 2.6. In this chapter we use
refugee and IDP populations from the UNHCR populations of concern database.
Figure 2.11 shows world aggregate time series of the number of IDPs and refugees. Over
the last few decades, the number of IDPs has increased remarkably, while the number of
refugees has stabilized.
The total number of forcibly displaced people keeps on growing and represents one of the
most important problems for humanity. Forced displacement is not a problem of just poor and
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Refugees IDPs
Figure 2.11: Trends in the aggregate number of refugees and IDPs
Figure 2.12 plots the number of countries listed by the UNHCR as the origin of some
refugees.
This number experienced a fairly constant growth until the mid 1980s, grew faster during
the late 1980s and 1990s and reached almost all the countries by the early 2000’s. The em-
pirical evidence reported below refers to the 1995-2016 period, including 200 countries and
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territories listed in Table 2.1.
Displacement counts prior to 1995 are used to compute the pre-sample mean. The data
includes only IDPs uprooted by conflict and human rights violations. Thus, the data does not
include displacement caused by natural disasters.2
Refugee data are dyadic time series, i.e. each refugee count is associated with an origin
country, a destination country and a year. IDP counts are longitudinal data, each involving a
country and year. We dropped all refugee counts whose origin were unknown and replaced
missing refugee or IDP counts by zero counts.3























1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Figure 2.12: Number of countries listed as origin of refugees in the UNHCR population statis-
tics. The vertical line divides the pre-sample (1960-1994) and sample periods (1995-2016).
2For a full report on internal displacement see Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2018).
3Marbach (2018) suggests a method to impute unknown origin refugee counts.
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Table 2.1: List of Countries
Countries and territories listed in the UNHCR population statistics included in the analysis:
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia,
Aruba, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus,
Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bermuda, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana,
Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cam-
bodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cayman Islands, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China,
Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech, North Korea, Den-
mark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, French Polynesia, Gabon, Gambia,
Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Gibraltar, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, South Korea,
Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Macao, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique,
Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Romania, Russia (Soviet Union), Rwanda,
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino,
Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suri-
name, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste,
Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Turks and Caicos Islands,
Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America,
Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Countries and territories listed in the UNHCR population statistics not included in the analysis:
American Samoa, Anguilla, Bonaire, Cook Islands, Curaçao, French Guiana, Guadeloupe,
Guam, Liechtenstein, Martinique, Monaco, Montenegro, Montserrat, Niue, Norfolk Island,
Palestine, Saint Maarten (Dutch part), Saint Pierre et Miquelon, Svalbard and Jan Mayen,
South Sudan, The Holy See, Tibetan, Wallis and Futuna Islands, Western Sahara.
In addition to IDPs and refugee counts, our data set includes the following covariates. Pop-
ulation data from the World Bank, which is used as a measure of exposure, that is, we measure
the number of refugees, IDPs and total displacement as a fraction of the origin country’s pop-
ulation. Area and the average Riley et al. (1999) index of terrain ruggedness are from Nunn
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and Puga (2012). Distances between each country’s most populated cities are from CEPII.
For the empirical analysis, a country’s proximity, Pi, is measured as an exponential average of






where di j represents the distance between country i and country j, measured as a fraction
of the largest distance.4 Conflict intensity data, from the UCDP-PRIO conflict dataset, are
measured as a categorical variable with three categories corresponding to no conflict, low
intensity conflict and high intensity conflict.
In addition to these covariates, we also include other control variables regarding which the
model does not contribute anything, but have previously been included in empirical models
of displacement. First, a large share of forced displacement does not have conflict as the root
cause, instead the cause forcing migration is the lack of civil liberties or political rights.
Therefore, we include categorical measures of civil liberties and political rights from Free-
dom House. Second, it is often argued that refugee counts hide economic migrants, therefore,
refugee counts should be negatively related with economic conditions in the source country.
Thus, we include GDP per capita from the World Bank in the empirical specification.
Third, another forced migration correlate reported in the literature is colonial relationship.
Thus, we include the number of countries with which a source country had a colonial relation-
ship (either as a colony or colonizer). Fourth, in the same vein, we also control for the number
of countries with which a source country shares language/ethnicity group in common with at
least 9% of the population.
The empirical evidence is complemented by including in the analysis other spatial covari-
ates that we did not account for in the theoretical model but might have a bearing in forced
displacement determination. A potentially relevant spatial variable is whether a country’s area
4Notice that the function e−di j satisfies the assumptions made about function α(di j).
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includes a large desert.
Our model assumes population is uniformly distributed in a country’s territory. However,
the presence of a desert invalidates our assumption. To account for this issue, we include an
indicator of whether more than 20% of a country’s area is a desert.
Another spatial feature that is not incorporated in our model is whether a country is land-
locked or not. Arguably, a landlocked country, surrounded by other countries, must be easier
to escape from than an island country. Therefore, we also include in the analysis an indicator
of whether a country is landlocked or not.
2.4.3 Empirics
In this section we report empirical evidence using data from 1995 to 2016. Table 2.2 re-
ports exponential regression estimates for refugee counts. Column (1) reports Pooled-GMM
estimates and includes only the spatial variables and conflict intensity, the only variables ac-
counted for in the theoretical model. As predicted by the model, area has a negative and
significant effect and proximity a positive and significant one. Ruggedness has a positive and
not statistically significant coefficient, while the model predicts a negative partial effect. In
accordance with the predictions of the model, conflict intensity has a positive effect on ex-
ternal displacement: high intensity conflicts have a positive and significant effect on refugee
counts, while low intensity ones do not affect refugee counts significantly. Next we focus on
the PSM-GMM estimates reported in columns (2), (3) and (4). These exponential regressions
include the (log of) the mean value of the endogenous variable (the number of refugees as
a fraction of population) during the pre-sample period, in our case, 1960-1994. Therefore,
the sample is restricted to 168 countries with positive pre-sample mean, so that the logarithm
can be computed. Adding the pre-sample mean to account for unobserved heterogeneity in
column (2) improves the goodness of fit considerably, as measured by the pseudo-R2. In
addition, the coefficient on ruggedness turns out to be negative, as predicted by the model,
although it is significant only at ten percent. Furthermore, the low intensity conflict indicator
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also becomes significant at the ten per cent level. Finally, the pre-sample mean is positive
and significant, thus indicating its relevance in accounting for heterogeneity. Column (3) in
Table 2.2 includes other determinants of refugee counts found relevant in the literature. Civil
liberties are measured on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest standards of civil
liberties and 7 the lowest. We incorporate this variable using 6 dummy variables for levels 2 to
7, leaving level 1 (the highest standards) as the reference group. It turns out that as we move
to lower civil liberties standards (from level 2 to level 7) the estimated coefficients are larger.
In other words, refugee counts are uniformly increasing as civil liberties standards deteriorate.
On the other hand, regarding the effect of economic conditions at the source countries, we
find that higher levels of real GDP per capita in origin countries are significantly associated
with lower refugee counts. However, neither the common linguistic-ethnicity proxy nor the
colonial-relation measure turn out to be significant. Overall, including civil liberties and GDP
per capita improves the goodness of fit and increases the significance of the spatial and conflict
intensity variables. Column (4) accounts for other spatial variables not considered in the the-
oretical model that might be relevant for refugee flows in practice. Neither the desert nor the
landlocked indicators are significant, while the results for the other covariates remain almost
invariant quantitatively and in terms of significance. Replacing the civil liberties with political
rights yields very similar results, which are not reported and available as an online appendix.
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Table 2.2: Exponential regressions: refugees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Log) Area -0.4904*** -0.3153*** -0.3405*** -0.3408***
(0.0814) (0.0943) (0.0688) (0.0662)
(Log) Ruggedness 0.3422 -0.2569* -0.3407** -0.3784**
(0.2526) (0.1428) (0.1544) (0.1883)
(Log) Proximity 0.1169*** 0.1017*** 0.0823** 0.0875**
(0.0419) (0.0393) (0.0400) (0.0421)
Low intensity conflict 0.5232 0.4658* 0.4262** 0.4034*
(0.3715) (0.2708) (0.2145) (0.2174)
High intensity conflict 2.7842*** 1.4917*** 0.8885*** 0.8442***
(0.4277) (0.3826) (0.2086) (0.2133)
Civil Liberties level 2 2.0607*** 2.0685***
(0.4322) (0.4324)
Civil Liberties level 3 2.0913*** 2.1427***
(0.4543) (0.4756)
Civil Liberties level 4 2.7370*** 2.7539***
(0.5185) (0.5443)
Civil Liberties level 5 3.0028*** 3.0490***
(0.5868) (0.6172)
Civil Liberties level 6 3.3458*** 3.4084***
(0.5667) (0.6008)
Civil Liberties level 7 3.9158*** 3.9849***
(0.6600) (0.7246)
(Log) GDP per capita -0.3777** -0.3915**
(0.1777) (0.1855)
(Log) # common ethnicity 0.1095 0.0983
(0.1125) (0.1093)
(Log) # colonial relations 0.1018 0.1094
(0.3295) (0.3329)




Pre-Sample Mean 0.4631*** 0.4851*** 0.4786***
(0.0908) (0.0485) (0.0497)
Constant -7.8443*** -3.9968*** -2.6189 -2.6316
(0.8706) (1.0009) (2.4906) (2.6564)
Pseudo - R2 0.4695 0.7596 0.8258 0.8269
Number of observations 4,395 3,691 3,455 3,455
Number of countries 200 168 161 161
Lagged population used as exposure in all regressions
Regressions include year and continent dummies.
Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
One, two and three stars stand for 10, 5 and 1 per cent significance levels.
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Table 2.3 reports the same exponential regressions as in Table 2.2 with two differences.
First, the dependent variable is now IDP counts. Second, Data on IDPs are available from
1993 to 2016. Thus, the pre-sample period includes only IDP counts for 1993 and 1994,
which leaves just two IDP counts to compute the pre-sample mean. However, under the as-
sumptions of our model, at the early stages of displacement, all people displaced are IDPs
and at later stages some become refugees. A positive refugee count is therefore evidence of
earlier internal displacement. This reasoning suggests that refugee counts must be preceded
by IDP counts. Accordingly, the pre-sample mean used in columns (2) to (4) corresponds to
the pre-sample mean of total displacement, that is, the sum of refugees and IDPs. The re-
sults reported in Table 2.3 are very similar to those reported in Table 2.2, both quantitatively
and in terms of significance. The only differences are that civil liberties and GDP per capita
are somewhat less significant for IDP regressions than for refugee ones. The second level
of civil liberties, below the highest standard, is not significantly different from the reference
group (civil liberties level 1, the highest standard). However, civil liberties level 7 (the low-
est standards) is highly significant and has a quantitatively similar coefficient estimate to the
refugees regression. IDP counts are not strictly uniformly decreasing in civil liberties, but
almost. In accordance with the model’s prediction, the coefficients on the conflict intensity
indicators are positive and statistically significant. Coefficient estimates on area, ruggedness
and proximity are significant and have the same signs as in the refugee regression. Appendix
2.7 shows that the model predicts that the partial derivatives of IDPs with respect to the spa-
tial variables might be either positive or negative depending on spatial variables and conflict
intensity values. Table 2.3 indicates that area has a negative partial effect, which is consistent
with the theory provided proximity is not very high. Ruggedness affects internal displacement
negatively and significantly, which is in line with the model only for low values of proximity.
Proximity has a positive coefficient on the IDPs regression, as predicted by the model for high
shock intensity. While this evidence fits the predictions of the model, strictly speaking, we
cannot validate nor refute the model based on the results from the IDPs regressions.
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Table 2.3: Exponential regressions: IDPs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Log) Area -0.6700*** -0.5265*** -0.4660*** -0.4864***
(0.1167) (0.1320) (0.1319) (0.1264)
(Log) Ruggedness -0.1353 -0.5013*** -0.6382*** -0.6126***
(0.1772) (0.1877) (0.2069) (0.2189)
(Log) Proximity 0.2325*** 0.2056*** 0.2259*** 0.2317***
(0.0625) (0.0581) (0.0784) (0.0775)
Low intensity conflict 2.2796*** 2.1725*** 1.6122*** 1.6423***
(0.5084) (0.5363) (0.4776) (0.4684)
High intensity conflict 3.7109*** 3.1088*** 2.0410*** 2.0134***
(0.5821) (0.6249) (0.6345) (0.6306)
Civil Liberties level 2 0.1799 -0.0497
(1.5346) (1.5198)
Civil Liberties level 3 1.9730* 1.6507
(1.1813) (1.1878)
Civil Liberties level 4 2.5737** 2.2679*
(1.2014) (1.2030)
Civil Liberties level 5 2.4682** 2.2481*
(1.2539) (1.2745)
Civil Liberties level 6 2.5747* 2.2566*
(1.3319) (1.3183)
Civil Liberties level 7 3.4573*** 3.0998**
(1.3349) (1.3512)
(Log) GDP per capita -0.5125* -0.7030**
(0.3007) (0.3119)
(Log) # common ethnicity 0.1874 0.1886
(0.1719) (0.1841)
(Log) # colonial relations 0.1733 0.2203
(0.2859) (0.2834)




Pre-Sample Mean 0.2708*** 0.2992*** 0.3232***
(0.0604) (0.0603) (0.0573)
Constant -10.8868*** -8.3968*** -4.0450 -1.9149
(1.1515) (1.2356) (4.0938) (4.0484)
Pseudo - R2 0.5702 0.6704 0.6988 0.7108
Number of observations 4,395 3,691 3,455 3,455
Number of countries 200 168 161 161
Lagged population used as exposure in all regressions which include year and continent dummies.
Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three stars stand for 10, 5 and 1
per cent significance levels.
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Table 2.4 reports exponential regression results for total displacement which are similar
to those found for internal and external displacement. In particular, the spatial variables,
area, ruggedness and proximity are significant and have the same signs as in the previous ta-
bles. Area and ruggedness have a negative effect on total displacement, as suggested by the
model. However, the model predicts proximity should not have any bearing in determining
total displacement, while we find a positive and significant effect. A feasible explanation of
this outcome is that total displacement and, in particular, refugee counts record not only con-
flict induced displacement, as assumed in the model, but also those who flee their country for
political, religious, ethnic, gender or other reasons, and also might include some economic
migrants. All these people might be more likely to flee their country of origin for higher prox-
imity levels. Results not reported but available upon request show that the findings reported in
Tables 2.2-2.4 remain very much the same when the civil liberties indicator is replaced with a
political rights indicator. Overall, our reading of the results is that they fundamentally agree
with the predictions of the theoretical model. First, all the evidence uses population as expo-
sure, as indicated by the model, and the specification choice results in good fit for this type of
data. Second, the spatial variables have the predicted coefficient signs in the regressions, with
the only exception of proximity in the total displacement regressions. Third, all displacement
counts (refugees, IDPs and total) are uniformly increasing in conflict intensity. Finally, the
other determinants of forced migration included in the regressions but not accounted for in the
theoretical model have coefficient signs which accord with previous findings in the literature.
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Table 2.4: Exponential regressions: total displacement
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Log) Area -0.5852*** -0.4046*** -0.3970*** -0.4105***
(0.0975) (0.1059) (0.0852) (0.0801)
(Log) Ruggedness 0.1133 -0.3564** -0.4557*** -0.4377**
(0.2048) (0.1489) (0.1674) (0.1812)
(Log) Proximity 0.1636*** 0.1403*** 0.1339*** 0.1434***
(0.0507) (0.0403) (0.0430) (0.0425)
Low intensity conflict 1.4362*** 1.3853*** 1.0883*** 1.0843***
(0.4243) (0.4216) (0.3233) (0.3141)
High intensity conflict 3.1726*** 2.3605*** 1.4707*** 1.4320***
(0.3818) (0.4185) (0.3843) (0.3683)
Civil Liberties level 2 0.9272 0.8299
(1.0391) (1.0420)
Civil Liberties level 3 2.0201** 1.8588*
(0.9441) (0.9530)
Civil Liberties level 4 2.7725*** 2.6221***
(0.9173) (0.9242)
Civil Liberties level 5 2.8663*** 2.7531***
(0.9622) (0.9713)
Civil Liberties level 6 3.0599*** 2.9244***
(0.9839) (0.9812)
Civil Liberties level 7 3.9046*** 3.7649***
(1.0253) (1.0367)
(Log) GDP per capita -0.4234** -0.5496***
(0.1991) (0.2033)
(Log) # common ethnicity 0.1803 0.1816
(0.1274) (0.1290)
(Log) # colonial relations 0.0263 0.0714
(0.2165) (0.2150)




Pre-Sample Mean 0.3380*** 0.3555*** 0.3671***
(0.0616) (0.0449) (0.0479)
Constant -8.4598*** -5.5005*** -3.2830 -1.8899
(0.9494) (0.9710) (2.7763) (2.7361)
Pseudo - R2 0.5189 0.7067 0.7616 0.7676
Number of observations 4,395 3,691 3,455 3,455
Number of countries 200 168 161 161
Lagged population used as exposure in all regressions which include year and continent dummies.
Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three stars stand for 10, 5 and 1
per cent significance levels.
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2.5 Conclusions
This chapter proposes a spatial model to analyze internal and external forced migration, a
topic of increasing relevance nowadays. The bare bones model worked out in this chapter
does not pretend to develop a new theory about how internal and external forced displacement
are generated. On the contrary, it recognizes that previous studies have shown that armed
conflict and lack of political rights or civil liberties cause people displacement. This is to say
that the root causes of forced displacement are well known. The contribution of this chapter
is to analyze the role of spatial factors in the relationship between the root causes (armed
conflict and lack of liberties) and forced displacement. In the causal inference jargon, these
spatial factors are called effect modifiers. The model predicts how some spatial factors are
related with internal, external and total displacement. In particular, we focus on country size
(measured by area), how abrupt the geography of a country is (measured by its ruggedness)
and the degree of geographical proximity of the country with respect to the rest of the world.
The model also predicts how conflict intensity ought to be related to internal displacement and
forced migration. In addition, the model suggests that population should be used as a measure
of exposure, and that is how it enters the empirical analysis. We test these predictions against
real data. The evidence reported is broadly consistent with the predictions of the model. We
chose to develop a barebones model intentionally, hoping that its simplicity would seduce
other scholars. There are a number of feasible extensions to this work. First, the model can be
developed using other spatial frameworks by assuming that the origin country is, say a circle,
or other two- or higher-dimensional figures. The model could also be solved under different
assumptions about how shocks affect people, induced displacement, costs of displacement,
cost of settlement and other issues we have not taken into account in our simplified model.
The model could also be used to model displacement provoked by natural disasters and the
predictions of such a model could be tested using data from displacement induced by natural
disasters. Finally, although our model focuses on the country of origin, the analysis could be
extended to destination countries, or even to dyadic flows.
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2.6 Appendix B: Data sources of Chapter 2
The data set compiled is a blend of the following data sets:
1. Persons of concern Dataset. United Nations High Commissioner for the Refugees (UN-
HCR). Time frame: 1951-2016. Variables used: Refugees, IDPs.
Availability: http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern
2. Armed Conflict Dataset. Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Uppsala University /
Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). Time frame: 1946-2015. Variables used: Loca-
tion. The name(s) of the country/countries whose government(s) have a primary claim
to the issue in dispute. Year of observation. The date when the conflict activity reached
25 battle-related deaths in a year. The date when conflict activity ended. The intensity
level of the armed conflict.
Availability: https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/
3. Freedom in the World Dataset. Freedom House. Time frame: 1972-2015. Variables
used: Civil Liberties and Political Rights.
Availability: https://freedomhouse.org
4. Geographical and Distance dataset. CEPII, SciencesPo Department of Economics. Dyadic
data set. Variables used: Common language/ethnicity indicator. Colonial relationship
indicator. Simple distance (most populated cities, km).
Availability: http://econ.sciences-po.fr/staff/thierry-mayer
5. World Development Indicators. The World Bank. Population. GDP per capita, PPP
(constant 2011 international $).
Availability: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx
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2.7 Appendix C: Expected values and derivatives of Chap-
ter 2
To integrate out the location we proceed in two regions defined by the intersection of the two
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Next we integrate 2.3 in four regions defined by the intersections of the four lines in Figure





































































































































(2s+1−2ls)dls i f s ∈ (12 ,1]
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which results in the much simpler expression

















2s2 i f s ∈ [0, 12 ]
4s−2s2 −1 i f s ∈ (12 ,1]
The fraction of the population that remain as IDPs is found by subtraction












2s−3s2 i f s ∈ [0, 12 ]
s2 −2s+1 i f s ∈ (12 ,1]
Next consider the model of Section 2.3.1. Integrating equation 2.7




















































a−γs[(γs− ls)+(ls+ γs−a)]/adls]/a i f s ∈ (a/2,a]
= (2γas− γ2s2)/a2 ∈ [0,a]
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Similarly integrating 2.8 we obtain



















































































































































i f s ∈ [0,a/4]
[
´ γs
0 αA,B (ls)/adls +
´ a−2γs
γs αA,B (2γs− ls)/adls
+
´ 2γs
a−2γs [αA,B (2γs− ls)+αB,C(ls +2γs−a)]/adls
+
´ a−γs
2γs αB,C (ls +2γs−a)/adls
+
´ a
a−γs αB,C (a− ls)/adls]/a






a−2γs αA,B (ls)/a+αB,C (ls+2γs−a)/adls
+
´ a−γs








i f s ∈ (a/3,a/2]
[
´ a−γs







γs αA,B (2γs− ls)/a+αB,C (a− ls)/adls]/a
i f s ∈ (a/2,a]
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2 i f s ∈ [0,a/4]
[γ2s2 (αA,B +αB,C)]/a
2 i f s ∈ (a/4,a/3]
[γ2s2 (αA,B +αB,C)]/a
2 i f s ∈ (a/3,a/2]
[(2γas− γ2s2 −a2/2)(αA,B+αB,C)]/a2 i f s ∈ (a/2,a]
In particular, we are interested in the derivatives of (2.4), (2.5) and (2.6) with respect to














Ruggedness and country size reduce the fraction of the population displaced while prox-
imity does not affect total displacement. The fraction of the population that become refugees
depends on these magnitudes in a way that depends on whether the shock is below or above



















≤ 0 i f s ∈ [0, a2 ]
2γs(γs−a)PB
a3
< 0 i f s ∈ (a2 ,a]
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> 0 i f s ∈ (a2 ,a]
Therefore, country size and ruggedness affect negatively and proximity positively the fraction
of the population that become refugees. Finally, the fraction of the population that become















i f s ∈ [0, a2 ]
2γs(γs−a)(1−PB)
a3










































i f s ∈ (a2 ,a].
While the signs of the derivatives of total displacement and refugees are uniform on s, this is
no longer the case for the signs of these derivatives of internal displacement
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0 ≤ PB ≤ 1 1 < PB ≤ 2
0 < γ ≤ 23 23 < γ ≤ 1
0 ≤ s ≤ a2
∂Els [I |s,a,γ(r),PB]
∂a
≤ 0 ∂Els [I |s,a,γ(r),PB]
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2 < s ≤ a
∂Els [I |s,a,γ(r),PB]
∂a
≤ 0 ∂Els [I |s,a,γ(r),PB]
∂a
> 0
0 ≤ PB ≤ 1 1 < PB ≤ 2
0 < γ ≤ 23 23 < γ ≤ 1
0 ≤ s ≤ a2
∂Els [I |s,a,γ(r),PB]
∂r
≤ 0 ∂Els [I |s,a,γ(r),PB]
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∂Els [I |s,a,γ(r),PB]
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Gender bias in refugee destination flows
Abstract
Men outnumber women in refugee flows. This chapter studies this difference in the number
of male and female refugees, i.e. the gender bias in destination flows. In order to analyze
the gender bias, we take into account factors such as civil liberties and per capita GDP of
destination countries, country of origin-related variables weighted by distance and measures of
women’s rights. The evidence suggests that the gender bias is greater (more male refugees than
female) in women-friendly destination countries and ones with high civil liberty standards,
isolated from poor and low civil liberty standards origin countries.
3.1 Introduction
Refugees abandon their origin countries escaping from armed conflicts or persecution. As ar-
gued in Echevarria and Gardeazabal (2016), refugees are likely to head for destination coun-
tries where armed conflicts do not occur and civil liberties are respected. In other words,
countries without armed conflicts, and with high levels of civil liberties are prone to receiv-
ing a larger number of refugees. However, the gender balance of these refugee flows is not
clear. This chapter contributes a gender perspective to the forced migration literature. We
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study the extent to which refugee arrivals in destination countries exhibit a gender bias and
its determinants. We define the gender bias in refugee destination flows as the difference in
the number of male and female refugees. The situation of female refugees has been studied
from many perspectives, but there are not studies regarding the gender profile of refugee des-
tination flows, either on a country-level, or on a global level. This chapter is an attempt to
fill this gap in the literature. There are several reasons to believe that the number of male and
female refugees might not be balanced. First, women’s economic and social rights are fewer
than men’s in many countries and therefore, women might have more reasons than men to
flee from countries where their rights are not respected. Second, being discriminated against,
women might find it more difficult to abandon their home country. Third, female refugees
might have more difficulty than male refugees in finding a destination country where their
freedom is respected and security is not an issue. Among the determinants of the gender bias
in refugee flows we consider destination-specific variables such as civil liberties, per capita
GDP, the degree of isolation of each destination country with respect to origin countries, and
the existence of armed conflicts in destination countries.
Intuition suggests that rich, free and close destination countries with no armed conflicts
might host more refugees. However, we have no real guide as to how these factors could
generate a greater proportion of male or female refugees in destination countries. To provide
greater flexibility to the specification, we also add interactions between per capita GDP and
civil liberties.
In Echevarria and Gardeazabal (2016), we saw that both origin -and destination- specific
variables play a key role in understanding dyadic refugees counts. However, in this chapter
we study the number of refugees hosted by each destination country. We use the distance
between countries to aggregate origin-related variables and include them in our estimations.
For each destination country, we measure the per capita GDP of all origin countries weighted
by distance. Thus, the resulting variable measures how close or far a destination country is
from rich or poor origin countries. Similarly, for each destination, we measure the level of
94
CHAPTER 3. GENDER BIAS 3.1. INTRODUCTION
civil liberties in all origin countries weighted by distance, to come up with a measure of how
far a destination country is from countries with high or low civil liberty standards. In addition,
for each destination, we also measure the interaction between GDP and civil liberties in each
origin country weighted by distance. Again, intuition suggests that destination countries close
to authoritarian and poor origin countries might host a greater proportion of refugees, but it is
not clear whether these variables ought to affect the gender bias.
However, all these determinants of refugee counts might affect the number of male and
female refugees differently, thus generating a gender bias. Another covariate accounted for in
our specification search is the World Bank’s Women, Business and Law index in destination
countries. This index measures women’s rights, such as the freedom of movement or the abil-
ity to have access to money. Intuition suggests that a country scoring low in this index should
receive less female refugees than other countries. This chapter contributes empirical evidence
divided into two set of estimations: we study the gender bias without gender-related variables,
on the one hand, and with gender-related variables (the Women, Business and Law index) on
the other hand. We use a panel data set of 154 countries covering the 2008-2016 period, for
the estimations without gender-related variables, and a panel data set of 137 countries in the
period 2009-2016 for the estimations with gender-related variables. Our empirical results sug-
gest that a greater proportion of female refugees go to destination countries where civil liberty
is not respected, while the proportion of male refugees is greater in countries with high civil
liberty standards.
The gender bias is smaller in destination countries far from rich and free origin countries.
On the contrary, more male refugees arrive in destination countries isolated from the poorest
origin countries with low civil liberty levels. As regards women’s economic or social rights,
destination countries close to poor origin countries with a smaller Women, Business and Law
index receive a greater proportion of female refugees. This result does not fit the intuition that
women should go where their liberties are respected. Previous literature regarding refugee
destination flows, and the economic and social rights of female refugees is mentioned in Sec-
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tion 3.2. Section 3.3 describes UNHCR data on refugees. The empirical analysis is shown in
Section 3.4, while Section 3.5 sums up the main conclusions.
3.2 Literature review
This study analyzes the gender bias in refugee destinations. The literature can be classified
into two areas: refugee destination studies and women’s economic and social rights studies.
Refugee destination flows have been studied from many perspectives: Groen (2016) pro-
poses a simulation of refugee movements through a network-based agent based model in order
to predict the most likely destination countries for the 2012 Northern Mali Conflict.
Suleimenova et al. (2017) present a generalized simulation development approach (SDA)
to predict how refugees are distributed across camps in destination countries, given a particular
conflict situation, for the cases of Burundi, Central African Republic and Mali.
Previous literature has mentioned many determinants of refugee flows. Moore and Shell-
man (2007a) do a global dyadic analysis of the pull-push characteristics of refugee flows by
introducing factors which determine why refugees leave origin countries, and why refugees
go to specific destination countries. Moore and Shellman (2007a) find that a high level of
democracy and per capita GNP attract more refugees to destination countries.
Echevarria and Gardeazabal (2016) propose a gravity model to investigate the determi-
nants of global refugee flows, introducing origin and destination-specific factors, such as the
level of civil liberties and per capita GDP of destination countries. In our study, we include the
civil liberties index and the per capita GDP of destination countries as factors of the gender
bias. We analyze whether these determinants imply a greater or lower gender bias. Neu-
mayer (2004) and Neumayer (2005b) focus their research on Western European countries to
determine the factors which attract more refugees to such destinations. Schaeffer (2010) intro-
duces a theoretical model to study whether prospective refugees decide to stay in their origin
countries, or leave to specific destination countries.
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The Havinga and Böcker (1999) study for Belgium, Netherlands and the UK finds that the
main factors behind asylum-seeker’s choice of destination country, are ties between the coun-
try of origin and the country of asylum as well as the characteristics of destination countries.
Echevarria and Gardeazabal (2016) introduce another covariate to study dyadic refugee flows:
the distance between origin and destination countries. They conclude that distance is one of
the main factors which reduce refugee flows between origin and destination countries. We
introduce the isolation of destination countries in our analysis in order to determine its effect
on the gender bias.
Armed conflict is one of the most important determinants of refugee flows. Therefore, this
is another determinant we include in our estimations of the gender bias, taking into account
that armed conflicts in destination countries reduce refugee flows in destination countries.
Böhmelt et al. (2019) study the effect of refugee destination flows on the risk of armed conflicts
between organized non-state groups, potentially creating a pull effect on such flows.
Milton et al. (2013) analyze the relationship between refugee flows and transnational ter-
rorism in destination countries. They point out the conditions in refugee camps and the treat-
ment host states give to refugees as possible causes of increasing transnational terrorism.
Fisk (2019) tests the relationship between camp-settlement and a communal conflict in
sub-Saharan Africa and proves that such conflict occurs more frequently in regions where
refugees are camp-settled.
Finally, regarding the policies which destination countries should implement, Thielemann
(2004) studies the evolution of asylum applications in Europe and suggests some policies so as
to harmonize the refugee destination flows in European countries. Alfano et al. (2016) explore
refugee policies in European destination countries and find that giving asylum to refugees
does not cause negative consequences for the destination countries, or negative effects on the
relationship with natives.
The second strand of literature focuses on women’s economic and social rights, in both
origin and destination countries. Bilgili et al. (2017) study the effects of displacement of
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Congolese refugees in Rwanda in terms of food insecurity, subjective poverty and economic
situation, focusing on gender. Ljungdell (1989), Baban et al. (2017) and Sansonetti (2016)
analyze how to integrate female refugees in a safe way, while Powell et al. (2002) introduce
female mutilation as a problem to deal with, and proposes policies for the integration of female
refugees in United Kingdom. Torres (2018) remarks on the importance of feminist geopolitical
perspectives on Latin American refugees. UNHCR (2003) analyzes sexual violence against
refugees in both origin and destination countries. The UNHCR (2016) report on Age, Gender
and Diversity Policy studies the causes and prevention of sexual and gender-based violence
among women, LGTBI minorities and indigenous people. Martin-Storey et al. (2018) studies
sexual violence in Canada across gender. Keygnaert et al. (2014) explore sexual gender-based
violence in European countries against refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented migrants,
and discusses determinants for ‘Desirable Prevention’.
Bonewit and Shreeves (2016) describe the situation of female refugees and asylum-seekers
in Germany from many perspectives, such as the services provided to them, the problems in
reception centers, or the asylum procedure. Akram (2013) mentions some protection policies
for female refugees in relation to the Millennium Development Goals.
As a contribution to this strand of literature, we analyze whether the respect for women’s
economic and social rights attract a greater proportion of female refugees in destination coun-
tries. On the other hand, we study whether the gender bias is greater (or lower) in destination
countries isolated from origin countries where women do not have economic or social rights.
3.3 The data
In this chapter we use data on refugees by gender from the UNHCR, i.e. the percentages
of male and female refugees, and the total number of refugees for each destination country
and year for the period 2008-2016. We compile a longitudinal dataset following three steps.
First, we multiply the number of total refugees in each destination country by the fraction of
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male and female refugees to obtain the total number of male and female refugees. Second, we
compute the difference between the number of male and female refugees for each destination
country and year. Third, we divide it by the total number of refugee to obtain the gender
bias, our dependent variable. Next, we show some descriptive figures on the gender bias at
the world-aggregate level. Figure 3.1 shows the difference between the number of male and
female refugees per year in all destination countries. In general terms, the gender bias is
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Figure 3.1: Gender bias in destination countries by year
Table 3.1 shows the average number of male and female refugees in the fifteen destination
countries which host the largest refugee populations. It can be seen that the number of male
refugees is greater than the number of female refugees in all countries but Jordan, Lebanon,
Chad, Uganda and Sudan. In cases like France or Germany, the proportion of male refugees
is 16 percent greater than the proportion of females.
Therefore, the existence of a gender bias in the number of refugees is clear. Figure 3.2
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completes the picture by showing a histogram of the average gender bias of all destination
countries for the period 2008-2016. The gender bias is negative in a very small proportion of
destination countries. Most destination countries host more male refugees than females. In
some countries, this difference is equal to one, indicating that all refugees are men.
Table 3.1: Average number of refugees: Top 15 destination countries (2008-2016)
Males Females Difference Percentage
Pakistan 879,443 768,388 111,055 6.74
Iran 546,643 417,459 129,184 13.39
Turkey 482,805 397,312 85,493 9.71
Jordan 262,631 270,829 -8,198 -1.54
Syria 267,487 258,838 8,649 1.64
Lebanon 236,483 246,429 -9,946 -2.1
Germany 279,606 200,646 78,960 16.44
Kenya 241,110 237,238 3,872 0.81
Ethiopia 204,438 200,691 3,747 0.92
Chad 166,220 212,143 -45,923 -12.14
Uganda 149,285 160,344 -11,059 -3,57
China 160,738 142,082 18,656 6,16
USA 143,408 124,957 18,451 6,85
France 135,234 97,559 37,675 16,47
Sudan 110,591 112,363 -1,772 -0,8
100
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Figure 3.2: Histogram of average gender bias (2008-2016)
Our dataset includes destination-specific and country of origin-related covariates, along
with a gender-related covariate. Regarding destination-specific covariates, the first covariate
we add in our estimations is the civil liberties index, because forced migrants tend to go to
countries where civil liberties are highly respected.
This index takes values between 1 (the highest level of civil liberties) and 7 (the lowest),
respectively. Due to the lack of a sufficiently large number of observations at the seventh level,
we merge levels 6 and 7. We want to determine whether more authoritarian countries host a
greater proportion of male or female refugees.
A second covariate we include is the per capita GDP of destination countries. Previous
studies have proven that refugees go to rich destination countries. Rich countries, in many
cases, are also the countries with the highest civil liberty standards.
We want to determine whether the gender bias is positively or negatively related to the per
capita GDP of destination countries. In addition, we also include the interaction between per
capita GDP and the level of civil liberties in destination countries in our regressions.
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The existence of armed conflicts in destination countries is the third covariate in our study
of the gender bias in refugee flows. We add a categorical variable with three levels of conflict
intensity: no conflict, low intensity conflicts and high intensity conflicts.
Many refugees move from their origin countries because of armed conflicts, and they tend
to go to conflict-less countries. However, we do not know whether the relationship between
armed conflicts in destination countries and the gender bias is positive or negative. This is
what we want to determine with our estimations.
A fourth covariate accounted for in our analysis is the isolation of destination countries
with respect to all origin countries. Isolation is a measure of how far a destination country
is from all origin countries. Intuitively, a country geographically far (isolated) from origin
countries would tend to have a lower number of refugees.
The isolation measure of each destination country is a function of the distance between a
particular destination country and all other origin countries. We construct the isolation mea-
sure as follows. First, we normalize the value of the greatest distance between an origin and
a destination country to one. Therefore, normalized distances are a proportion of the greatest,
and range from zero to one.
We measure country j’s isolation, I j, as the sum of (normalized) distances from that par-






where N is equal to the number of origin countries and di j represents the (normalized) distance
from country i to country j. Intuitively, the isolation of a destination country with respect to
origin countries is negatively related to refugee flows. However, we want to determine whether
isolated destination countries host more male or female refugees.
Origin countries play a key role in determining refugee flows to destination countries. For
example, it is reasonable to assume that poor and authoritarian origin countries generate more
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refugees than rich and free origin countries, and that refugees will tend to head for nearby
destination countries. Therefore, we use distance as an aggregating factor of variables such as
civil liberties and the per capita GDP of origin countries.
We compute weighted sums of countries of origin-specific variables weighted by their dis-
tances to a particular destination country, and repeat this for all destination countries. These
variables are destination-specific variables, because they measure the distance from destina-
tion countries to rich/poor and free/authoritarian origin countries.
In particular, we compute a weighted sum of the levels of civil liberties in origin countries






where CLi is the Civil Liberties level of origin country i, which is weighted by the distance
between origin country i and destination country j. In order to understand this construct,
consider a country very close to free origin countries.
This means a low value of this weighted sum (recall that the Civil Liberties index ranges
from level 1, the highest civil liberty standards to 6, the lowest civil liberty standards). Simi-
larly, a country very close to authoritarian origin countries would have a higher value of this
weighted sum.
Intuition suggests that the country closer to authoritarian origin countries would tend to
host a greater proportion of refugees, due to the proximity to countries from which refugees
flee. Similarly, we compute a weighted sum of country of origin per capita GDP weighted by






In this case, it seems reasonable to us to assume that a country close to poor origin countries,
would host a greater proportion of refugees than a country close to rich origin countries.
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However, it is not clear if the gender bias will be greater or lower in these destination countries.
In addition, we also compute a weighted sum of the interaction between per capita GDP









In a similar way to the reasoning behind previous weighted sums, a small value of this mag-
nitude corresponds to a destination country close to poor and authoritarian origin countries,
while a large value would correspond to a destination country far from rich and free origin
countries.
We point out that there are just a few cases of very rich and authoritarian, or very poor
and free origin countries. Therefore, origin countries are generally rich and democratic, or
poor and authoritarian. Intuition suggests that a country far from rich and free origin countries
would host a greater proportion of refugees than a country far from poor and authoritarian
origin countries.
While the inclusion of civil liberties in our analysis seems reasonable, this variable mea-
sures the rights of both men and women altogether, without taking into account whether male
and female civil liberties are equally respected.
To account for this shortcoming of the civil liberties measure, we also consider a gender-
related variable in our analysis: the World Bank Women, Business and Law index (WBLI).
This index is computed as an average of the following factors: women’s rights to travel to
places, start a job, get paid, get married, have children, run a business, manage assets and
receive a pension.
The WBLI takes values from zero (the absence of economic, social and judicial rights)
to 100 (the highest level). Arguably, holding everything else constant, women should go to
destination countries where their rights are more respected.
In many origin countries, women do not have the same economic or social rights as men.
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Therefore, in addition to women’s rights in destination countries, women’s rights in origin
countries are also very important in the determination of refugee destination flows.
As we explained above, we compute a weighted sum of the WBLI in origin countries
weighted by their distances to a destination country as follows:





High values of this index indicate isolation from origin countries where women’s rights are
respected. Intuition suggests that the gender bias should be larger in destination countries far
from origin countries where women’s rights are respected, because women would decide not
to go to such destination countries.
Finally, we have also computed a weighted sum of the interaction of per capita GDP and





(di j ∗GDPi ∗WBLIi)
Intuition suggests that destination countries far from origin countries with high levels of
per capita GDP and rights for women (or closer to poor and authoritarian origin countries,
from where refugees flee), attract a greater proportion of male refugees.
We also introduce a variable which measures the total number of origin countries which
suffer armed conflicts and are contiguous to each destination country. Intuition suggests that
a destination country contiguous to a considerable number of origin countries in conflict will
host a greater proportion of refugees. However, we cannot determine the effect on the gender
bias without including this variable in our estimations.
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Variable definitions and sources are shown in Appendix 3.6, and summary statistics are
reported in Table 3.2 without logarithms and in Table 3.3 with logarithms. The gender bias
ranges from -0.54 to one. This means that, in a specific destination country, the bias is 54%
greater for female refugees and in another destination country, there are only male refugees. In
108 observations of our dataset the bias is equal to zero. Destination countries with the lowest
respect for civil liberties are the most frequent in the sample, while countries with the greatest
respect for civil liberties are the least frequent observations in the sample. The isolation of
destination countries has a mean value equal to 90.17, which is closer to its minimum value
than to its maximum value. The GDP per capita of destination countries ranges from its
minimum value, which equals 568.08 dollars, to its maximum value, which equals 129,349.9
dollars, with an average value of 15,237.9 dollars. There are no armed conflicts in 81 percent
of observations of this sample and, amongst armed conflicts, low intensity conflicts have a
greater frequency than high intensity conflicts. Most destination countries have a moderately
high WBLI score, as can be seen in its mean value.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics of female and male refugees and covariates (without logarithms)
Variable # obs. mean stand.dev. min max
Gender bias 1205 0.17 0.26 -0.54 1
Civil Liberties level 1 1166 0.12 0.33 0 1
Civil Liberties level 2 1166 0.14 0.35 0 1
Civil Liberties level 3 1166 0.18 0.38 0 1
Civil Liberties level 4 1166 0.17 0.38 0 1
Civil Liberties level 5 1166 0.19 0.39 0 1
Civil Liberties levels 6 & 7 1166 0.19 0.39 0 1
Isolation 1189 90.17 15.90 72.90 148.92
GDPpcDestination 1132 15,237.90 19,248.94 568.08 129,349.90
Conflict Level 0 1205 0.81 0.39 0 1
Conflict Level 1 1205 0.14 0.35 0 1
Conflict Level 2 1205 0.05 0.21 0 1
WBLI 1015 69.39 18.15 23.13 100
Contiguous Origin Countries
Conflict
1205 0.94 1.19 0 6
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics of female and male refugees and covariates (with logarithms)
Variable # obs. mean stand.dev. min max
Gender bias 1205 0.17 0.26 -0.54 1
Civil Liberties level 1 1166 0.12 0.33 0 1
Civil Liberties level 2 1166 0.14 0.35 0 1
Civil Liberties level 3 1166 0.18 0.38 0 1
Civil Liberties level 4 1166 0.17 0.38 0 1
Civil Liberties level 5 1166 0.19 0.39 0 1
Civil Liberties levels 6 & 7 1166 0.19 0.39 0 1
(Log) Isolation 1189 4.49 0.17 4.29 5.01
(Log) GDPpcDestination 1132 8.96 1.22 6.34 11.77
Conflict Level 0 1205 0.81 0.39 0 1
Conflict Level 1 1205 0.14 0.35 0 1
Conflict Level 2 1205 0.05 0.21 0 1
(Log) WBLI 1015 4.20 0.32 3.14 4.61
Contiguous Origin Countries
Conflict
1205 0.94 1.19 0 6
3.4 Empirics
3.4.1 Gender bias without gender-related covariates
Table 3.4 reports marginal effects of OLS linear regression estimates with standard errors
clustered at country level using a total of 1,095 observations from 154 countries. Regression
estimations are included in Table 3.8 in the Appendix.
As we introduce an interaction term, the effect of civil liberties and per capita GDP can
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only be determined by computing their marginal effects. These marginal effects compare each
level of the civil liberties index with respect to the reference, which is the greatest respect of
civil liberties.
Regarding the per capita GDP of destination countries, we compute its marginal effect
at each civil liberties level, from one to six. Column 1 estimates suggest that the gender bias
diminishes as civil liberties deteriorate. This result is counter-intuitive, as women would enjoy
more freedom in countries with high standards of civil liberties.
In addition, the gender bias increases in richer and more isolated countries. Armed conflict
is not a significant determinant of the gender bias. Column 2 includes the total number of
contiguous origin countries which suffer armed conflicts, which turns out to be significant,
and has a negative coefficient.
This means that the gender bias is lower in destination countries with more contiguous
origin countries in conflict. Summing up, it can be observed that a lower level of respect
for civil liberties implies a lower gender bias, so results related to civil liberties are counter-
intuitive, as in Column 1.
In addition, the per capita GDP affects the gender bias positively, as shown by the marginal
effects of per capita GDP in Table 3.4 for each level of the civil liberties index. Regarding
isolation, its interpretation has not changed: a destination country which is more isolated with
respect to the rest of origin countries attracts a greater proportion of male refugees.
The gender bias is not different in countries with armed conflicts (both intensity levels)
with respect to countries where armed conflicts do not occur.Columns 3, 4 and 5 add the
marginal effects corresponding to the country of origin-related variables weighted by distance.
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With respect to the results reported in Column 2, adding the origin-related variables does
not quantitatively change the results of the other covariates to any significant effect. Civil
liberties consistently affect the gender bias negatively, while the per capita GDP of the des-
tination country maintains a positive effect on the gender bias, as marginal effects show in
Table 3.4. The results for civil liberties are remarkably robust, despite the different specifi-
cations across columns. The total number of contiguous origin countries in conflict for each
destination country consistently has a negative effect on the gender bias. Amongst the origin-
related variables, the per capita GDP of origin countries weighted by distance is significant
in Columns 3 and 4, but not in Column 5. Destination countries isolated from rich origin
countries (or close to poor origin countries) receive a greater proportion of female refugees.
In Column 5, the interaction of per capita GDP and civil liberties of origin countries weighted
by distance is significant and negative. This means that destination countries far from rich and
free origin countries host a greater proportion of female refugees than destination countries
close to free origin countries.
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Table 3.4: Marginal effects of OLS regressions for the gender bias (2008-2016)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Civil Liberties level 2 -0.3166* -0.3198* -0.3156** -0.3101** -0.3241**
(0.1696) (0.1705) (0.1543) (0.1556) (0.1531)
Civil Liberties level 3 -0.3563** -0.3578** -0.3717** -0.3749** -0.3858**
(0.1687) (0.1694) (0.1525) (0.1544) (0.1525)
Civil Liberties level 4 -0.3541** -0.3512** -0.3733** -0.3640** -0.3678**
(0.1688) (0.1697) (0.1527) (0.1543) (0.1517)
Civil Liberties level 5 -0.4414*** -0.4373*** -0.4475*** -0.4325*** -0.4159***
(0.1686) (0.1695) (0.1532) (0.1548) (0.1529)
Civil Liberties level 6 -0.4393*** -0.4223** -0.4424*** -0.4273*** -0.4102***
(0.1686) (0.1701) (0.1537) (0.1549) (0.1529)
(Log) Isolation 0.2157** 0.1905* 0.9747*** 0.7864* 3.2512***
(0.1058) (0.1059) (0.3346) (0.4140) (1.1487)
Conflict Intensity 1 0.0192 0.0302 0.0264 0.0273 0.0271
(0.0351) (0.0344) (0.0336) (0.0325) (0.0308)
Conflict Intensity 2 0.0319 0.0375 0.0140 0.0155 0.0277
(0.0310) (0.0278) (0.0318) (0.0327) (0.0302)
(Log) GDPpc | CL1 -0.1602* -0.1677* -0.1935** -0.2034** -0.2379***
(0.0959) (0.0963) (0.0869) (0.0895) (0.0888)
(Log) GDPpc | CL2 0.0999*** 0.0997*** 0.0791** 0.0709* 0.0737*
(0.0372) (0.0387) (0.0375) (0.0386) (0.0392)
(Log) GDPpc | CL3 0.0604** 0.060** 0.0424* 0.0286 0.0270
(0.0254) (0.0258) (0.0275) (0.0299) (0.0307)
(Log) GDPpc | CL4 0.0796*** 0.0786*** 0.0534*** 0.0493** 0.0467**
(0.0168) (0.0170) (0.0204) (0.0206) (0.0191)
(Log) GDPpc | CL5 0.0066 0.0044 -0.0119 -0.0128 -0.0052
(0.0179) (0.0185) (0.0192) (0.0186) (0.0176)
(Log) GDPpc | CL6 0.0329*** 0.0317** 0.0101 0.0060 0.0139
(0.0113) (0.0126) (0.0141) (0.0140) (0.0129)
Contiguous Countries Conflict -0.0180** -0.0215** -0.0204** -0.0177**
(0.0086) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0085)
(Log) GDPpc Origin -0.5134** -0.5970*** 0.5449
(0.2075) (0.2096) (0.4180)
(Log) CL Origin 0.2273 -1.1453
(0.2225) (0.5949)
(Log) CL GDPpc Origin -1.3137**
(0.5129)
Constant 0.9729 1.1692 5.0205*** 5.8775*** 4.1247**
(1.2022) (1.2064) (1.8524) (1.9813) (1.8640)
Observations 1,095 1,095 1,095 1,095 1,095
Number of countries 154 154 154 154 154
R-squared 0.2169 0.2225 0.2463 0.2491 0.2684
Standard errors have been computed with the Delta Method. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include year dummies.
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3.4.2 Gender bias with gender-related variables: the WBL index
In this subsection, we study the effect of women’s specific rights on the gender bias. Table 3.5
reports marginal effects of OLS linear regression estimates where the specification includes
isolation, the conflict intensity indicator and the per capita GDP.
Then, the specification replaces civil liberties with the WBLI; it also includes the interac-
tion between the WBLI and the per capita GDP of destination countries. Regression estima-
tions are included in Table 3.9 in the Appendix.
In order to compute the marginal effects of the interacted variables, we divide them in
percentiles and we show the results of the 20, 40, 60 and 80th percentiles. As explained above,
the civil liberties index does not take into account whether there is a gender difference in civil
liberties.
To account for this possibility, in this section we introduce the WBLI. As a result, the
sample is now reduced to the period 2009-2016 period and 151 countries for a total of 968
observations. Column 1 shows that the gender bias is positively related to higher levels of
women’s economic and social rights, except for the poorest destination countries, where the
WBLI has no effect on the gender bias.
Again, this result is counter-intuitive.If female refugees had the opportunity, they would
choose to go to countries where their economic rights were respected. Armed conflict in
destination countries is not relevant when explaining the gender bias.
More isolated destination countries host a greater proportion of male refugees. Finally,
the gender bias is greater in rich destination countries at every level of the WBLI. Column 2
includes the total number of contiguous origin countries, where there are armed conflicts, of
each destination country.
It turns out that the gender bias is lower in destination countries contiguous to origin coun-
tries where there are armed conflicts, while the effect of the other covariates remain qualita-
tively similar to those in Column 1.
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Table 3.5: Marginal Effects with gender-related variables for the gender bias (2009-2016)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Log) WBLI | P20GDPpc 0.0539 0.0245 0.0245 0.0240 0.0316
0.0488) (0.0539) (0.0537) (0.0505) (0.0506)
(Log) WBLI | P40 GDPpc 0.1012*** 0.0770* 0.0755* 0.0581 0.0427
(0.0381) (0.0425) (0.0424) (0.0398) (0.0419)
(Log) WBLI | P60 GDPpc 0.1330*** 0.1123*** 0.1097*** 0.0809** 0.0502
(0.0372) (0.0412) (0.0411) (0.0398) (0.0457)
(Log) WBLI | P80 GDPpc 0.1635*** 0.1462*** 0.1425*** 0.1028** 0.0573
(0.0415) (0.0455) (0.0453) (0.0454) (0.0554)
(Log) Isolation 0.3366*** 0.3081*** 0.9006*** 5.2483** 4.7845**
(0.1021) (0.1018) (0.3416) (2.2601) (2.3741)
Conflict Level 1 -0.0094 0.0026 -0.0023 0.0029 0.0062
(0.0346) (0.0341) (0.0342) (0.0327) (0.0309)
Conflict Level 2 0.0047 0.0114 -0.0087 0.0108 0.0152
(0.0341) (0.0951) (0.0950) (0.0379) (0.0388)
(Log) GDPpc | P20 WBLI 0.0496*** 0.0457*** 0.0313** 0.0369*** 0.0303**
(0.009) (0.01) (0.0131) (0.0122) (0.0145)
(Log) GDPpc | P40 WBLI 0.0616*** 0.0591*** 0.0442*** 0.0455*** 0.0331*
(0.01) (0.0105) (0.0134) (0.0132) (0.0181)
(Log) GDPpc | P60 WBLI 0.0652*** 0.0631*** 0.0481*** 0.0481*** 0.0340*
(0.0109) (0.0113) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0195)
(Log) GDPpc | P80 WBLI 0.0695*** 0.0679*** 0.0527*** 0.0512*** 0.0350
(0.0122) (0.0125) (0.0150) (0.0152) (0.0215)
Contiguous Countries Conflict -0.0185* -0.0230** -0.0179* -0.0146
(0.0101) (0.0107) (0.0104) (0.01)
(Log) GDP Origin -0.3923* -0.3306* 0.0884
(0.2116) (0.1902) (0.3974)
(Log) WBLI Origin -3.4573** -2.7799
(1.6616) (1.8773)
(Log) WBLI GDP Origin -0.6309
(0.5044)
Constant -0.5706 -0.1160 2.7422 11.0304** 12.3199**
(0.9609) (1.0350) (1.8278) (5.0207) (4.8363)
Observations 968 968 968 968 968
Number of countries 151 151 151 151 151
R-squared 0.1826 0.1883 0.2024 0.2197 0.2253
Standard errors have been computed with the Delta Method
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include year dummies.
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Column 3 includes the per capita GDP of origin countries weighted by distance. It turns
out that the gender bias is lower in destination countries isolated from rich origin countries (or
close to poor countries) while the effect of the other covariates remains qualitatively similar
to that in Column 2.
Column 4 includes the WBLI of origin countries weighted by distance. The gender bias is
lower in destination countries isolated from origin countries with a high WBLI (close to coun-
tries with a low WBLI). As in Column 3, more isolated destination countries tend to exhibit
a greater gender bias, but now the marginal effect is much larger. As in Column 3, GDP at
origin is significant.Column 5 adds the interaction between the per capita GDP and the WBLI
of origin countries weighted by distance. This interaction turns out to be insignificant. Mean-
while, the WBLI of origin countries and the interaction between per capita GDP and WBLI
of origin countries weighted by distance are no longer significant. Therefore, our preferred
estimation is Column 4. Summarizing the results of Tables 3.4 and 3.5, the gender bias tends
to be larger in isolated and rich countries with high standards of civil liberties and women’s
rights. A feasible reading of this result is that female refugees are discriminated against and
therefore are forced to flee to nearby poor countries with low civil liberty standards countries.
3.4.3 Robustness checks
To account for the presence of unobserved confounders Tables 3.6 and 3.7 report marginal
effects of random effects estimates without and with gender-related variables respectively.
Regression estimations are included in Tables 3.10 and 3.11 in the Appendix. The results
obtained are qualitatively the same as those reported above. Random effects estimates might
be biased if the unobserved confounders are correlated with the covariates included in the
regression. Fixed effects estimates would not suffer from such a bias.However, as some of
the key explanatory variables, namely civil liberties and women’s rights, vary very little with
time, their effect on the gender bias cannot be identified.
114
CHAPTER 3. GENDER BIAS 3.4. EMPIRICS
Table 3.6: Marginal effects of random effects regressions for the gender bias (2008-2016)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Civil Liberties level 2 -0.3552** -0.3544** -0.3567** -0.3531** -0.3434**
(0.1469) (0.1461) (0.1412) (0.1414) (0.1426)
Civil Liberties level 3 -0.4046*** -0.4010*** -0.4098*** -0.4074*** -0.3819***
(0.1482) (0.1473) (0.1423) (0.1427) (0.1447)
Civil Liberties level 4 -0.4291*** -0.4205*** -0.4331*** -0.4247*** -0.4001***
(0.1502) (0.1494) (0.1437) (0.1439) (0.1471)
Civil Liberties level 5 -0.4804*** -0.4686*** -0.4816*** -0.4691*** -0.4416***
(0.1502) (0.1495) (0.1443) (0.1449) (0.1477)
Civil Liberties level 6 -0.4795*** -0.4645*** -0.4820*** -0.4674*** -0.4345***
(0.1523) (0.1521) (0.1473) (0.1474) (0.1503)
(Log) Isolation 0.2749** 0.2444** 0.9033** 0.6846 2.3383**
(0.1186) (0.1176) (0.4004) (0.5249) (1.1291)
Conflict Level 1 -0.0033 -0.0069 -0.0080 -0.0070 -0.0073
(0.0173) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0176) (0.0174)
Conflict Level 2 -0.0163 -0.0167 -0.0212 -0.0200 -0.0221
(0.0453) (0.0458) (0.0473) (0.0473) (0.0470)
(Log) GDPpc | CL1 -0.2058** -0.2109** -0.2301*** -0.2399*** -0.2601***
(0.0846) (0.0840) (0.0814) (0.0841) (0.0838)
(Log) GDPpc | CL2 0.0620* 0.0601* 0.0478 0.0388 0.0318
(0.0319) (0.0329) (0.0325) (0.0343) (0.0344)
(Log) GDPpc | CL3 0.0580** 0.0561** 0.0438* 0.0347 0.0321
(0.0234) (0.0232) (0.0258) (0.0273) (0.0281)
(Log) GDPpc | CL4 0.0492** 0.0488** 0.0330 0.0279 0.0261
(0.02) (0.02) (0.0222) (0.0225) (0.0219)
(Log) GDPpc | CL5 0.0285* 0.0252 0.0096 0.0067 0.0079
(0.0165) (0.0171) (0.0183) (0.0187) (0.0179)
(Log) GDPpc | CL6 0.0161 0.0145 -0.0022 -0.0055 -0.0038
(0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0181) (0.0187) (0.0184)
Contiguous Countries Conflict -0.0186** -0.0197** -0.0186** -0.0183**
(0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0076) (0.0076)
(Log) GDPpc Origin -0.4421* -0.5259** 0.2451
(0.2531) (0.2460) (0.4300)
(Log) CL Origin 0.2501 -0.6094
(0.2899) (0.5909)
(Log) CL GDP Origin -0.9464**
(0.4773)
Constant 1.1966 1.3936 4.7503** 5.6243*** 4.8734**
(1.1439) (1.1365) (2.1025) (2.1760) (2.1884)
Observations 1,095 1,095 1,095 1,095 1,095
Number of countries 154 154 154 154 154
R-squared 0.1990 0.2030 0.2314 0.2340 0.2501
Standard errors have been computed with the Delta Method. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include year dummies.
115
3.4. EMPIRICS CHAPTER 3. GENDER BIAS
Table 3.7: Marginal Effects of random-effects regressions, with gender-related variables, for
the gender bias (2009-2016)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Log) WBLI | P20GDPpc 0.0539 0.0245 0.0245 0.0240 0.0316
0.0488) (0.0539) (0.0537) (0.0505) (0.0506)
(Log) WBLI | P40 GDPpc 0.1012*** 0.0770* 0.0755* 0.0581 0.0427
(0.0381) (0.0425) (0.0424) (0.0398) (0.0419)
(Log) WBLI | P60 GDPpc 0.1330*** 0.1123*** 0.1097*** 0.0809** 0.0502
(0.0372) (0.0412) (0.0411) (0.0398) (0.0457)
(Log) WBLI | P80 GDPpc 0.1635*** 0.1462*** 0.1425*** 0.1028** 0.0573
(0.0415) (0.0455) (0.0453) (0.0454) (0.0554)
(Log) Isolation 0.3366*** 0.3081*** 0.9006*** 5.2483** 4.7845**
(0.1021) (0.1018) (0.3416) (2.2601) (2.3741)
Conflict Level 1 -0.0094 0.0026 -0.0023 0.0029 0.0062
(0.0346) (0.0341) (0.0342) (0.0327) (0.0309)
Conflict Level 2 0.0047 0.0114 -0.0087 0.0108 0.0152
(0.0341) (0.0951) (0.0950) (0.0379) (0.0388)
(Log) GDPpc | P20 WBLI 0.0496*** 0.0457*** 0.0313** 0.0369*** 0.0303**
(0.009) (0.01) (0.0131) (0.0122) (0.0145)
(Log) GDPpc | P40 WBLI 0.0616*** 0.0591*** 0.0442*** 0.0455*** 0.0331*
(0.01) (0.0105) (0.0134) (0.0132) (0.0181)
(Log) GDPpc | P60 WBLI 0.0652*** 0.0631*** 0.0481*** 0.0481*** 0.0340*
(0.0109) (0.0113) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0195)
(Log) GDPpc | P80 WBLI 0.0695*** 0.0679*** 0.0527*** 0.0512*** 0.0350
(0.0122) (0.0125) (0.0150) (0.0152) (0.0215)
Contiguous Countries Conflict -0.0185* -0.0230** -0.0179* -0.0146
(0.0101) (0.0107) (0.0104) (0.01)
(Log) GDP Origin -0.3923* -0.3306* 0.0884
(0.2116) (0.1902) (0.3974)
(Log) WBLI Origin -3.4573** -2.7799
(1.6616) (1.8773)
(Log) WBLI GDP Origin -0.6309
(0.5044)
Constant -0.5706 -0.1160 2.7422 11.0304** 12.3199**
(0.9609) (1.0350) (1.8278) (5.0207) (4.8363)
Observations 968 968 968 968 968
Number of countries 151 151 151 151 151
R-squared 0.1826 0.1883 0.2024 0.2197 0.2253
Standard errors have been computed with the Delta Method. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All regressions include year dummies.
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3.5 Conclusions
This chapter studies the gender bias (the difference in the number of male and female refugees)
in destination flows for the period 2008-2016. This chapter takes into account several deter-
minants of refugee destination flows considered in previous studies.
The contribution of this chapter is to analyze the effect of these factors on the gender bias,
which has never been dealt with before. We analyze the effect of various types of covariates on
the gender bias: destination-specific variables, country of origin-related variables and gender-
related variables.
Summing up the results obtained, we find that the gender bias in refugee destinations
is larger in countries with high levels of economic and social rights, in isolated destination
countries and also in rich destination countries.As regards origin-related variables, the bias is
larger in destination countries isolated from poor and authoritarian origin countries.
An interpretation of this result is that men might have the necessary economic and social
rights in their origin countries to flee to free destination countries. Women, on the contrary,
lacking economic and social rights can only escape to closer destination countries which often
happen to be authoritarian and poor.
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3.6 Appendix D: Data sources of Chapter 3
The data set compiled is a blend of the following data sets:
1. Refugees by gender Dataset. United Nations High Commissioner for the Refugees (UN-
HCR). Time frame: 2008-2016. Variables used: Gender bias
Availability: http://www.unhcr.org/statistical-yearbooks.html
2. Armed Conflict Dataset. Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Uppsala University /
Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). Time frame: 1946-2017. Variables used: Loca-
tion. The name(s) of the country/countries whose government(s) have a primary claim
to the issue in dispute. Year of observation. The date when the conflict activity reached
25 battle-related deaths in a year. The date when conflict activity ended. The intensity
level of the armed conflict, total number of contiguous origin countries in conflict.
Availability: https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/
3. Freedom in the World Dataset. Freedom House. Time frame: 1972-2017. Variables
used: Civil Liberties. Availability: https://freedomhouse.org
4. Geographical and Distance dataset. CEPII, SciencesPo Department of Economics. Dyadic
data set. Variables used: Simple distance (most populated cities, km). Transformed into
longitudinal variables: isolation, the sum of total distance w.r.t. the rest of origin coun-
tries, country of origin-related variables weighted by distance, total number of contigu-
ous origin countries in conflict.
Availability: http://econ.sciences-po.fr/staff/thierry-mayer
5. World Development Indicators. The World Bank.Variables used: GDP per capita, PPP
(current international dollars). Availability: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/
home.aspx
6. World Bank. Women, Business and the Law Dataset. Variables used: Women, Business
and the Law index (WBLINDEX). Availability: http://wbl.worldbank.org/
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3.7 Appendix E: Parameter estimates of Chapter 3
Table 3.8: Parameter estimates corresponding to Table 3.4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Civil Liberties level 2 -2.6416** -2.7102** -2.7530*** -2.7618*** -3.1090***
(1.0947) (1.1040) (0.9973) (1.0118) (1.0037)
Civil Liberties level 3 -2.3279** -2.3928** -2.4808*** -2.4487** -2.7538***
(1.0406) (1.0467) (0.9505) (0.9606) (0.9493)
Civil Liberties level 4 -2.4975** -2.5527** -2.5802*** -2.6230*** -2.9118***
(1.0365) (1.0410) (0.9431) (0.9610) (0.9437)
Civil Liberties level 5 -1.9326* -1.9757* -2.0713** -2.1360** -2.4960***
(1.0343) (1.0387) (0.9365) (0.9524) (0.9427)
Civil Liberties level 6 -2.1648** -2.2045** -2.2624** -2.2988** -2.6610***
(1.0239) (1.0294) (0.9271) (0.9429) (0.9308)
(Log) Isolation 0.2157** 0.1905* 0.9747*** 0.7864* 3.2512***
(0.1058) (0.1059) (0.3346) (0.4140) (1.1487)
(Log) GDPpc Destination -0.1602* -0.1677* -0.1935** -0.2034** -0.2379***
(0.0959) (0.0963) (0.0869) (0.0895) (0.0888)
Conflict Intensity 1 0.0192 0.0302 0.0264 0.0273 0.0271
(0.0351) (0.0344) (0.0336) (0.0325) (0.0308)
Conflict Intensity 2 0.0319 0.0375 0.0140 0.0155 0.0277
(0.0310) (0.0278) (0.0318) (0.0327) (0.0302)
(Log) GDPpc*CL level 2 0.2601** 0.2674** 0.2727*** 0.2743*** 0.3115***
(0.1053) (0.1063) (0.0964) (0.0980) (0.0978)
(Log) GDPpc*CL level 3 0.2206** 0.2277** 0.2359** 0.2320** 0.2649***
(0.0991) (0.0998) (0.0910) (0.0919) (0.0909)
(Log) GDPpc*CL level 4 0.2398** 0.2463** 0.2469*** 0.2527*** 0.2846***
(0.0981) (0.0986) (0.0896) (0.0917) (0.0901)
(Log) GDPpc*CL level 5 0.1668* 0.1721* 0.1816** 0.1906** 0.2327**
(0.0975) (0.0979) (0.0884) (0.0902) (0.0896)
(Log) GDPpc*CL level 6 0.1930** 0.1994** 0.2036** 0.2094** 0.2518***
(0.0963) (0.0969) (0.0873) (0.0891) (0.0882)
Contiguous Countries Conflict -0.0180** -0.0215** -0.0204** -0.0177**
(0.0086) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0085)
(Log) GDP Origin -0.5134** -0.5970*** 0.5449
(0.2075) (0.2096) (0.4180)
(Log) CL Origin 0.2273 -1.1453
(0.2225) (0.5949)
(Log) CL GDP Origin -1.3137**
(0.5129)
Constant 0.9729 1.1692 5.0205*** 5.8775*** 4.1247**
(1.2022) (1.2064) (1.8524) (1.9813) (1.8640)
Observations 1,095 1,095 1,095 1,095 1,095
Number of countries 154 154 154 154 154
R-squared 0.2169 0.2225 0.2463 0.2491 0.2684
Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include year dummies.
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Table 3.9: Parameter estimates corresponding to Table 3.5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Log) WBLI -0.3012 -0.3697* -0.3578* -0.2311 -0.0517
(0.2007) (0.2168) (0.2156) (0.2145) (0.2412)
(Log) Isolation 0.3366*** 0.3081*** 0.9006*** 5.2483** 4.7845**
(0.1021) (0.1018) (0.3416) (2.2601) (2.3741)
Conflict Level 1 -0.0094 0.0026 -0.0023 0.0029 0.0062
(0.0346) (0.0341) (0.0342) (0.0327) (0.0309)
Conflict Level 2 0.0047 0.0114 -0.0087 0.0108 0.0152
(0.0341) (0.0344) (0.0414) (0.0379) (0.0388)
(Log) GDPpc Destination -0.1349 -0.1591* -0.1674* -0.0957 -0.0130
(0.0873) (0.0951) (0.0950) (0.0946) (0.1048)
(Log) WBLI * (Log) GDPpc 0.0462** 0.0513** 0.0497** 0.0332 0.0108
(0.0215) (0.0231) (0.0230) (0.0233) (0.0272)
Contiguous Countries Conflict -0.0184* -0.0226** -0.0179* -0.0146
(0.0101) (0.0107) (0.0104) (0.0100)
(Log) GDP Origin -0.3923* -0.3306* 0.0884
(0.2116) (0.1902) (0.3974)
(Log) WBLI Origin -3.4573** -2.7799
(1.6616) (1.8774)
(Log) WBLI GDP Origin -0.6309
(0.5044)
Constant -0.5705 -0.1160 2.7422 11.0304** 12.3199**
(0.9609) (1.0350) (1.8278) (5.0207) (4.8363)
Observations 968 968 968 968 968
Number of countries 151 151 151 151 151
R-squared 0.1826 0.1883 0.2024 0.2197 0.2253
Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All regressions include year dummies.
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Table 3.10: Parameter estimates corresponding to Table 3.6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Civil Liberties level 2 -2.7484*** -2.7774*** -2.8405*** -2.8446*** -2.9600***
(0.9829) (0.9810) (0.9454) (0.9509) (0.9541)
Civil Liberties level 3 -2.7623*** -2.7881*** -2.8574*** -2.8618*** -3.0080***
(0.9283) (0.9226) (0.8918) (0.8962) (0.8955)
Civil Liberties level 4 -2.7083*** -2.7418*** -2.7842*** -2.8187*** -2.9657***
(0.9288) (0.9219) (0.8939) (0.9041) (0.9012)
Civil Liberties level 5 -2.5742*** -2.5798*** -2.6236*** -2.6732*** -2.8371***
(0.9124) (0.9062) (0.8810) (0.8896) (0.8883)
Civil Liberties level 6 -2.4627*** -2.4792*** -2.5187*** -2.5626*** -2.7306***
(0.9085) (0.9027) (0.8763) (0.8854) (0.8838)
(Log) Isolation 0.2749** 0.2444** 0.9033** 0.6846 2.3383**
(0.1186) (0.1176) (0.4004) (0.5249) (1.1291)
(Log) GDPpc Destination -0.2058** -0.2109** -0.2300*** -0.2399*** -0.2600***
(0.0846) (0.0840) (0.0814) (0.0841) (0.0838)
Conflict Level 1 -0.0033 -0.0069 -0.0080 -0.0070 -0.0073
(0.0173) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0176) (0.0174)
Conflict Level 2 -0.0163 -0.0167 -0.0212 -0.0200 -0.0221
(0.0453) (0.0458) (0.0473) (0.0473) (0.0470)
(Log) GDPpc*CL level 2 0.2677*** 0.2711*** 0.2779*** 0.2787*** 0.2918***
(0.0946) (0.0945) (0.0911) (0.0918) (0.0922)
(Log) GDPpc*CL level 3 0.2637*** 0.2670*** 0.2738*** 0.2746*** 0.2921***
(0.0887) (0.0882) (0.0853) (0.0858) (0.0856)
(Log) GDPpc*CL level 4 0.2550*** 0.2597*** 0.2630*** 0.2678*** 0.2860***
(0.0883) (0.0876) (0.0851) (0.0865) (0.0860)
(Log) GDPpc*CL level 5 0.2342*** 0.2362*** 0.2396*** 0.2466*** 0.2679***
(0.0861) (0.0855) (0.0832) (0.0844) (0.0841)
(Log) GDPpc*CL level 6 0.2218*** 0.2254*** 0.2278*** 0.2344*** 0.2562***
(0.0856) (0.0851) (0.0827) (0.0840) (0.0837)
Contiguous Countries Conflict -0.0186** -0.0197** -0.0186** -0.0183**
(0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0076)
(Log) GDP Origin -0.4421* -0.5259** 0.2451
(0.2531) (0.2460) (0.4300)
(Log) CL Origin 0.2501 -0.6094
(0.2899) (0.5909)
(Log) CL GDP Origin -0.9464**
(0.4773)
Constant 1.1966 1.3936 4.7503** 5.6243*** 4.8734**
(1.1439) (1.1365) (2.1025) (2.1760) (2.1884)
Observations 1,095 1,095 1,095 1,095 1,095
Number of countries 154 154 154 154 154
R-squared 0.1990 0.2030 0.2314 0.2340 0.2501
Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include year dummies.
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Table 3.11: Parameter estimates corresponding to Table 3.7
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Log) WBLI -0.0373 -0.1004 -0.0788 -0.0419 0.1488
(0.2576) (0.2676) (0.2665) (0.2753) (0.3004)
(Log) Isolation 0.3956*** 0.3550*** 0.7112 2.8289 2.4772
(0.1188) (0.1181) (0.4421) (2.8772) (2.9473)
Conflict Level 1 -0.0162 -0.0215 -0.0222 -0.0208 -0.0189
(0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0181)
Conflict Level 2 -0.0302 -0.0307 -0.0332 -0.0295 -0.0263
(0.0543) (0.0556) (0.0565) (0.0567) (0.0565)
(Log) GDPpc Destination -0.0292 -0.0497 -0.0492 -0.0237 0.0642
(0.1084) (0.1143) (0.1126) (0.1168) (0.1266)
(Log) WBLI * (Log) GDPpc 0.0170 0.0209 0.0189 0.0133 -0.0111
(0.0262) (0.0275) (0.0273) (0.0284) (0.0324)
Contiguous Countries Conflict -0.0224*** -0.0232*** -0.0221*** -0.0201***
(0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0073) (0.0068)
(Log) GDP Origin -0.2383 -0.1737 0.3075
(0.2840) (0.2414) (0.4768)
(Log) WBLI Origin -1.7363 -1.0264
(2.1102) (2.3581)
(Log) WBLI GDP Origin -0.7851
(0.5949)
Constant -1.7960 -1.2934 0.3870 4.4878 6.9055
(1.1095) (1.1673) (2.2278) (6.5542) (5.8759)
Observations 968 968 968 968 968
Number of countries 151 151 151 151 151
R-squared 0.1826 0.1883 0.2024 0.2197 0.2253
Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.






This thesis studies the push and pull factors of internal and external forced migration com-
prising three essays on: (i) the determinants of dyadic refugee flows, (ii) spatial factors in in-
ternal displacement and forced migration and (iii) gender bias in refugee destinations. The first
chapter introduces a gravity model, a workbench used to model international trade and migra-
tion, in order to study dyadic refugee flows for the 1990-2013 period. Two estimation methods
are used so as to analyze the determinants of refugee flows: the OLS logarithmic specification
and the Poisson exponential mean specification. The evidence reported has shown that armed
conflicts and low standards of civil liberties lead to refugees in origin countries, while popu-
lation, proximity and high standards of civil liberties attract refugees to destination countries.
From a policy point of view, refugee flows could be reduced by avoiding armed conflicts and
improving the standards of civil liberties in origin countries. The second chapter develops a
spatial model of internal and external forced migration to study refugee and IDP counts for
the period 1995-2016. The spatial model we develop represents armed conflict as a shock that
takes place at a particular location and generates a migration flow. Along with the intensity
of armed conflicts, we take into account geographical factors such as country size, orography
and distance to other countries. The empirical evidence indicates that area and ruggedness
reduce the proportion of refugees and IDPs, while the lack of civil liberties, proximity and
armed conflicts lead to more refugees and IDPs. However, the intensity of armed conflicts
is also important when distinguishing the evolution of both groups for the last decades: low
intensity conflicts lead to refugees to a lesser extent than high intensity conflicts, which in
addition also generate IDPs. The final chapter studies the gender bias in destination flows, for
the period 2008-2016. In order to analyze the gender bias, we take into account factors such
as civil liberties and the per capita GDP of destination countries, country of origin-related
variables weighted by distance, and measures of women’s rights. The evidence suggests that
the gender bias is greater (more male refugees than female) in destination countries that are
rich, women-friendly and have high civil liberty standards, isolated from origin countries that








Akgündüz, Y. E. and Torun, H. (2018). Two and a half million syrian refugees, skill mix and
capital intensity. GLO Discussion Paper Series 186, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
Akram, S. (2013). Millennium development goals and the protection of displaced and refugee
women and girls. Laws, 2(3):283–313.
Alfano, M., Dustmann, C., Frattini, T., and Fasani, F. (2016). Refugees and economic mi-
grants: Facts, policies and challenges.
Alix-Garcia, J., Bartlett, A., and Saah, D. (2012). Displaced populations, humanitarian as-
sistance and hosts: A framework for analyzing impacts on semi-urban households. World
Development, 40(2):373 – 386.
Alix-Garcia, J., Bartlett, A., and Saah, D. (2013). The landscape of conflict: IDPs, aid and
land-use change in Darfur. Journal of Economic Geography, 13(4):589–617.
Alix-Garcia, J. and Saah, D. (2009). The effect of refugee inflows on host communities:
Evidence from tanzania. World Bank Economic Review, 24:148–170.
Anderson, J. E. (2011). The gravity model. Annual Review of Economics, 3(1):133–160.
Anderson, J. E. and van Wincoop, E. (2003). Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border
Puzzle. American Economic Review, 93(1):170–192.
Aronow, P. M., Samii, C., and Assenova, V. A. (2015). Cluster–robust variance estimation for
dyadic data. Political Analysis.
129
BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ayata, B. and Yukseker, D. (2005). A belated awakening: national and international responses
to the internal displacement of kurds in turkey. New perspectives on Turkey, 32:5–42.
Baban, F., Ilcan, S., and Rygiel, K. (2017). Syrian refugees in turkey: pathways to precarity,
differential inclusion, and negotiated citizenship rights. Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies, 43(1):41–57.
Baez, J. E. (2011). Civil wars beyond their borders: The human capital and health conse-
quences of hosting refugees. Journal of Development Economics, 96(2):391 – 408.
Ball, P., Betts, W., Scheuren, F., Dudukovich, J., and Asher, J. (2002). Political killings
in kosova/kosovo, march-june 1999. Technical report, American Association for the Ad-
vancement of Science.
Barthel, F. and Neumayer, E. (2015). Spatial dependence in asylum migration. Journal of
Ethnic and Migration Studies, 41(7):1131–1151.
Beck, N. and Katz, J. N. (2001). Throwing out the baby with the bath water: A comment on
green, kim, and yoon. International Organization, 55:487–495.
Bergstrand, J. H. and Egger, P. (2007). A knowledge-and-physical-capital model of inter-
national trade flows, foreign direct investment, and multinational enterprises. Journal of
International Economics, 73(2):278–308.
Bilgili, O., Loschmann, C., and Siegel, M. (2017). The gender-based effects of displacement:
The case of congolese refugees in rwanda.
Blundell, R., Griffith, R., and Windmeijer, F. (2002). Individual effects and dynamics in count
data models. Journal of Econometrics, 108(1):113 – 131.
Böhmelt, T., Bove, V., and Gleditsch, K. S. (2019). Blame the victims? refugees, state capac-
ity, and non-state actor violence. Journal of Peace Research, 56(1):73–87.
130
BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bohnet, H., Cottier, F., and Hug, S. (2018). Conflict-induced idps and the spread of conflict.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 62(4):691–716.
Bonewit, A. and Shreeves, R. (2016). Reception of female refugees and asylum seekers in the
eu: case study germany. Brussels: Directorate General for International Policies.
Borjas, G. J. (2017). The wage impact of the marielitos: A reappraisal. ILR Review,
70(5):1077–1110.
Cameron, A. C., Gelbach, J. B., and Miller, D. L. (2011). Robust inference with multiway
clustering. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 29(2):238–249.
Cameron, A. C. and Miller, D. L. (2014). Robust inference for dyadic data. Technical report,
University of California at Davis.
Card, D. (1990). The impact of the mariel boatlift on the miami labor market. ILR Review,
43(2):245–257.
Ceritoglu, E., Yunculer, H. B. G., Torun, H., and Tumen, S. (2017). The impact of syrian
refugees on natives’ labor market outcomes in turkey: evidence from a quasi-experimental
design. IZA Journal of Labor Policy, 6(1):5.
Crisp, J. (2010). Forced displacement in africa: Dimensions, difficulties, and policy directions.
Refugee Survey Quarterly, 29(3):1–27.
Czaika, M. (2009a). Asylum cooperation among asymmetric countries: The case of the euro-
pean union. European Union Politics, 10(1):89–113.
Czaika, M. (2009b). The Political Economy of Refugee Migration and Foreign Aid. Palgrave
Macmillan.
Czaika, M. and Kis-Katos, K. (2009). Civil conflict and displacement: Village-level determi-
nants of forced migration in aceh. Journal of Peace Research, 46(3):399–418.
131
BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY
Davenport, C., Moore, W., and Poe, S. (2003). Sometimes you just have to leave: Domestic
threats and forced migration, 1964-1989. International Interactions, 29(1):27–55.
Depetris-Chauvin, E. and Santos, R. J. (2018). Unexpected guests: The impact of internal
displacement inflows on rental prices in colombian host cities. Journal of Development
Economics, 134:289 – 309.
Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., and Langlotz, S. (2019). The effects of foreign aid on refugee flows.
European Economic Review, 112:127 – 147.
Echevarria, J. and Gardeazabal, J. (2016). Refugee gravitation. Public Choice, 169(3-4):269–
292.
Engel, S. and Ibáñez, A. M. (2007). Displacement due to violence in colombia: A household
level analysis. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 55(2):335–365.
Erikson, R. S., Pinto, P. M., and Rader, K. T. (2014). Dyadic analysis in international relations:
A cautionary tale. Political Analysis.
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